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SUING THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: CAN THE KING 
STILL DO NO WRONG? 
Kathleen Howard Mereditht 
Jennifer S. Pressmantt 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Federal Tort Claims Act 1 (FTCA or Act) was enacted by Con-
gress in 1946 as a waiver of federal sovereign immunity. 2 The waiver of 
immunity provision in the FTCA appears broad and sweeping at first 
glance: it provides that the United States "shall be liable [for tort claims] 
in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under 
like circumstances."3 What Congress gave in one breath, however, it se-
verely restricted in another. By its express terms, the Act exempts thir-
teen specific classes of tort claims from the waiver of immunity.4 This 
t B.A. summa cum laude, 1975, University of Baltimore; J.D. summa cum laude, 
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Esquire. 
I. Pub. L. No. 79-601, §§ 401-424, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified as amended at 28 
u.s.c. §§ 1291, 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401, 2402, 2411, 2412, 2671-78, 2680 
(1982)). 
2. Prior to 1946, the United States government could not be sued in tort. The only 
relief available to those injured by governmental wrongs was through private relief 
bills in Congress. From the early twentieth century on, Congress found itself over-
whelmed by thousands of private claim bills, and pressured by a growing number of 
courts, commentators, and legislators who criticized the unjust application of sover-
eign immunity to bar every claim alleging serious injury through governmental acts. 
See, e.g., Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. I, 129,229 (1924-
25). In response to public criticism and the deluge of private relief bills, the U.S. 
House of Representatives in 1919 introduced a bill to waive sovereign immunity, 
with some limitations. See H.R. 14737, 65th Cong., 3d Sess. (1919). Congress con-
sidered a version of the bill in every session between 1919 and 1946, when the Act 
was finally passed. For a detailed discussion of the legislative history of the FTCA 
and its exceptions, see L. JAYSON, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS: ADMINIS-
TRATIVE AND JUDICIAL REMEDIES§§ 51-64 (1988). 
The version of the FTCA passed in 1946 shifted review of claims against the 
United States government to federal courts. In addition to establishing federal juris-
diction over such claims, the current version of the FTCA provides that the Gov-
ernment consents, with stated exceptions, to suits involving torts committed by 
government agents, officials, and employees. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 
(1982). 
3. 28 u.s.c. § 2674 (1982). 
4. Section 1346(b) does not apply to any claim: 
(a) based upon the exercise or performance of discretionary function by a 
federal agency or government employee; 
(b) arising out of postal negligence; 
(c) regarding tax collection or detention of goods by any law enforcement 
officer, including customs; 
(d) in admiralty for which a remedy is already provided; 
(e) arising during war and related to national defense; 
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Article examines how judicial expansion of the exceptions to the waiver 
of sovereign immunity has resulted in the dismissal of FTCA claims not 
intended by Congress to be barred. 
This Article makes no attempt to describe each reservation of gov-
ernmental immunity, and focuses instead on four situations in which the 
reserved sovereign immunity most frequently acts to bar suit:5 (1) claims 
arising out of certain common law intentional torts;6 (2) claims arising in 
a foreign country; 7 (3) suits by service members against the government 
where the injuries arise out of or in the course of activity incident to 
military service;8 and (4) claims arising out of the exercise or perform-
ance of a discretionary function. 9 
After reviewing the judicial expansion of the legislated exceptions to 
the FTCA, and the creation by the Supreme Court of an additional ex-
ception not enumerated in the FTCA, 10 this Article suggests that courts 
have gone beyond the intent of Congress in reserving sovereign immunity 
to the federal government. The lack of clear definitions and consistent 
interpretation of the exceptions has resulted in both the dismissal of 
proper claims and conflicting opinions among lower courts. This Article 
concludes that courts should pay greater deference to congressional in-
tent in interpreting the FTCA exceptions, should read those exceptions 
more narrowly, and should avoid judicial creation of new exceptions. 
Congressional guidance and amendment would help to clarify vague 
terms and limit judicial expansion of FTCA exceptions. 
(f) for damages caused by government quarantine; 
(g) repealed; 
(h) arising out of 11 enumerated intentional torts, except for several torts 
committed by "investigative or law enforcement officers" of the United 
States government; 
(i) for damages caused by the fiscal operations of the Treasury or by regu-
lation of the monetary system; 
(j) arising out of military combatant activities during time of war; 
(k) arising in a foreign country; 
(I) arising from the activities of the Tennessee Valley Authority; 
(m) arising from the activities of the Panama Canal Company; and 
(n) arising from the activities of certain Federal banks. 
(paraphrasing 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1982)). 
5. While this Article discusses each exception separately, the reader must consider that 
more than one exception may arise in the same suit. See, e.g., United States v. 
Shearer, 473 U.S. 52 (1985) (claim barred by both intentional tort exception and 
Feres doctrine); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 1242 
(E.D.N.Y.) (court considered Feres doctrine, foreign country exception, "combatant 
activities" exception and discretionary function exception), appeal dismissed, 745 
F.2d 161 (2d Cir. 1984). 
6. 28 u.s.c. § 2680(h) (1982). 
7. Jd. § 2680(k). 
8. I d. § 2680(j). The scope of Section 2680(j) was expanded by the Supreme Court in 
Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950). The doctrine emanating from this deci-
sion is known as the Feres doctrine, which is further discussed infra at text and 
notes contained in Part IV. 
9. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1982). 
10. See supra note 8. 
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II. CLAIMS ARISING OUT OF INTENTIONAL TORTS 
The intentional tort exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity 
reserves to the government immunity for claims "arising out of" eleven 
intentional common law torts, including assault, .battery, false imprison-
ment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, 
misrepresentation, deceit and interference with contract rights. 11 
Although the exception appears straightforward, inventive lawyers have 
found fertile ground for litigation in the "arising out of" language by 
framing claims in terms of the government's negligent breach of an af-
firmative duty to a plaintiff.J2 Inconsistent interpretations of the phrase 
"arising out of," and the lack of clear congressional intent in enacting the 
intentional tort exception, 13 have resulted in conflicting approaches by 
lower courts. 14 
In discussing the intentional tort exception, this Article focuses 
solely on cases involving the intentional torts of assault and battery. 
These cases, more than any others, give rise to claims in which a negli-
gent breach of duty precedes the injurious intentional conduct. 
11. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1982). In 1974 Congress amended section 2680(h) to allow 
suits for assault, battery, false imprisonment, abuse of process and malicious prose-
cution arising out of the tortious acts or omissions of federal investigative or law 
·enforcement officers. Act of March 16, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-253, § 2, 88 Stat. 50. 
In enacting the 1974 amendment, which expanded governmental liability, Congress 
was responding to the apparent injustice in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents 
of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). See S. REP. No. 588, 93d 
Cong., 2d Sess. 2, as cited in Note, The Talismanic Language of Section 2680(h) of 
the Federal Tort Claims Act, 60 TEMP. L.Q. 243, 254 (1987). In Bivens, federal 
narcotics agents conducting a criminal surveillance mistakenly raided the wrong 
private dwellings and terrorized the residents. The residents' only remedy was a 
private action against the agents. Congress amended section 2680(h) to create a 
cause of action against the federal government in such cases. See, e.g., Celestine v. 
United States, 841 F.2d 851, 852-53 (8th Cir. 1988) (Veterans' Administration se-
curity guard was a "law enforcement officer," and as such, claim of assault and 
battery was not barred under section 2680(h)); cf Jones v. Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation, 139 F. Supp. 38, 42-43 (D. Md. 1956) (pre-amendment case holding claim 
of assault and battery by FBI agents barred by section 2680(h)). 
12. See, e.g., Doe v. Scott, 652 F. Supp. 549, 552-53 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (assault and bat-
tery exception of section 2680(h) does not bar suit against the federal government 
for negligence of federally employed child care workers where government's breach 
of duty to protect children in its care proximately caused children's injuries). 
13. The legislative history of section 2680(h) has been described as "sparse," United 
States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 55 (1985), and "meager," Panella v. United States, 
216 F.2d 622, 625 (2d Cir. 1954). 
14. Compare Thigpen v. United States, 800 F.2d 393, 395-96 (4th Cir. 1986) (Section 
2680(h) "draws no distinction for cases involving a 'affirmative duty' owed by gov-
ernment to plaintiffs") with Doe v. United States, 838 F.2d 220, 223 (7th Cir. 1988) 
("Where the government affirmatively assumes a duty to the victim prior to the 
assault, and the government breaches that duty causing injury to the victim, we 
cannot say that her claim arises out of the assault. Rather, it rises out of the breach 
of that affirmative duty."). 
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A. Historical Background of the Intentional Tort Exception: The 
Employee/ Nonemployee Approach 
The legislative history of section 2680(h), sparse as it is, provides 
some support for allowing a claim when the negligence of the federal 
government results in an assault and battery. While there is little indica-
tion that Congress gave much thought to such claims, what discussion 
there was reflects that Congress never intended to bar claims for negli-
gently caused assaults and batteries. 15 
The lack of clear congressional intent, however, led some courts to 
infer that Section 2680(h) barred any negligence claim related in any way 
to an assault or battery. 16 The Second Circuit, in response to the confu-
sion surrounding the intended scope of the intentional tort exception, 
rejected this interpretation.J7 In Panella v. United States, 18 the court sug-
15. The only discussion regarding claims of governmental negligence leading to assault 
and battery took place during the 1942 hearings before the House Judiciary Com-
mittee. In support of allowing such claims, Assistant Attorney General Francis M. 
Shea told committee members that an injury caused by governmental negligence 
which results in assault and battery would not be barred by the FfCA exception: 
Mr. Robinson: On that point of deliberate assault that is where some 
agent of the government gets in a fight with some fellow: Mr. Shea: Yes. 
Mr. Robinson: And socks him? 
Mr. Shea: That is right. 
Mr. Cravens: Assuming a C.C.C. automobile runs into a man and dam-
ages him then under the common law, where that still prevails, is not that 
considered an assault and is not the action based on assault and battery? 
Mr. Shea: I should think not. I would think under the common law 
rather that would be trespass on the case. 
Mr. Cravens: Trespass on the case? Mr. Shea: Yes. 
Mr. Cravens: I do not remember these things very well, but it seems to me 
there are some cases predicated on assault and battery even though they 
were personal injury cases. 
Mr. Shea: No; I think under the common law pleading you have the same 
writ, but it makes a distinction between an assault and negligence. 
Mr. Cravens: This refers to a deliberate assault? 
Mr. Shea: That is right. 
Mr. Cravens: If he hit someone deliberately? 
Mr. Shea: That is right. 
Mr. Cravens: Is it not intended to exclude negligent assaults? 
Mr. Shea: No. An injury caused by negligence could be considered under 
the bill. 
Tort Claims: Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463 Before the House Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 33-34 (1942) (emphasis added) (quoted in Note, Sec-
tion 2680(h) of the Federal Tort Claims Act: Government Liability for the Negligent 
Failure to Prevent an Assault and Battery by a Federal Employee, 69 GEO. L.J. 803, 
809-810 (1981)) [hereinafter Note, Assault and Battery Exception]. 
Interestingly, courts which have denied claims of governmental negligence 
which culminated in an assault have focused on the first part of Mr. Shea's exchange 
with the House Judiciary Committee, but have ignored the last two lines. See 
United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 55 (1985); Panella v. United States, 216 F.2d 
622, 626 (2d Cir. 1954). 
16. See Johnson v. United States, 788 F.2d 845, 850 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 914 
(1986); Collins v. United States, 259 F. Supp. 363, 364 (E.D. Pa. 1966). 
17. Panella v. United States, 60 F.2d 622, 624 (2d Cir. 1954) ("In construing the Ian-
1989] Suing the Federal Government 479 
gested that a negligence suit against the government be allowed when the 
underlying assault is committed by a non-government employee. 19 A 
suit to hold the government liable on a negligence theory for assaults 
committed by government employees, on the other hand, would be 
barred under Section 2680(h). 20 
In adopting the employee/nonemployee distinction, the court rea-
soned that a suit involving an assault by a government employee should 
be barred because the negligence claim would be "merely an alternative 
form of remedy" to the assault claim. 21 Implicit in the court's reasoning 
is the assumption that suits involving assaults by government employees 
are grounded in the doctrine of respondeat superior,22 which holds an 
employer vicariously liable for the tortious acts of an employee commit-
ted within the scope of employment. 23 Further implicit in the court's 
reasoning is the belief that federal tort claims plaintiffs would circumvent 
the assault and battery exception by framing the complaint in negli-
gence.24 The court's analysis, however, ignores the reality that negli-
gently caused assault and battery involves two separate tort claims-the 
first for the government's negligence in hiring, supervising or training its 
employee, and the second for the actual assault and battery. The govern-
ment's negligence is a distinct and actionable tort claim, and not a back 
door attempt to avoid the intentional tort exception. 25 
guage of the Act, we should, on the one hand, give full scope to the Government's 
relinquishment of its historic immunity from suit, and on the other hand, avoid 
narrowing the provisions which set forth situations in which Congress has seen fit to 
retain that immunity. Our object should be to read the Act so as to make it 'consis-
tent and equitable'. . . . It is true that Section 2680(h), retaining immunity against 
claims arising out of assault and battery, can literally be read to apply to assaults 
committed by persons other than government employees. But we think such a con-
struction out of keeping with the rest of the act.") (citing Feres v. United States, 340 
u.s. 135, 139 (1949)). 
18. 60 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1954). In Panella, an outpatient stabbed another patient at a 
federal mental hospital. The victim sued the government under the FTCA claiming 
that his injury was caused by the negligent failure of security guards to prevent the 
assault. The court, in an opinion written by then Judge Harlan, held that section 
2680(h) did not bar a claim for a negligently caused assault committed by a non-
government employee. /d. 
19. /d. at 624-25. 
20. /d. at 624. It should be noted that the Panella approach leads to incongruous and 
irrational results. It seems difficult to justify why the government should be held 
liable for negligently failing to prevent an assault by a non-government tortfeasor 
such as the patient in Panella, over whom the government has little or no control, 
and not liable under the same circumstances when the assault is committed by a 
government employee, over whom the government does exercise control. 
21. /d. 
22. See, e.g., Naisbitt v. United States, 611 F.2d 1350, 1356 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 449 
u.s. 885 (1980). 
23. See generally W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND 
KEETON ON TORTS§ 69, at 499 (5th ed. 1984) (employer liable for employee's acts 
under doctrine of respondeat superior). 
24. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 788 F.2d 845, 851 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 
u.s. 914 (1986). 
25. For a fuller discussion of the Panella court's flawed reasoning in adopting the em-
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The employee/nonemployee distinction used in Panella and its 
progeny has been criticized by courts and commentators alike. 26 In some 
respects, the conflict surrounding the employee/nonemployee approach 
has shifted to a debate over how to determine when a claim "arises out 
of" an intentional tort. 
B. Definition of "Arising Out of" an Intentional Tort: Conflicting 
Approaches 
Judicial interpretation of the "arises out of" language of Section 
2680(h) is conflicting.27 Some courts interpret this language literally, dis-
missing any claim in which an assault or battery is a basis of liability.28 
ployee/nonemployee approach, see Note, Assault and Battery Exception, supra note 
15, at 814-22 and accompanying notes. 
26. See Doe v. United States, 838 F.2d 220, 222 (7th Cir. 1988) (rejecting the employee/ 
nonemployee approach because "it cuts too rough a path and unnecessarily thwarts 
congressional intent"); Bennett v. United States, 803 F.2d 1502, 1504 (9th Cir. 
1986) (rejecting approach that bases government liability on employee/nonem-
ployee distinction because there is "nothing in the legislative history or in the lan-
guage of the statute that evinces any congressional purpose to distinguish between 
supervised employees and supervised nonemployees"); Thigpen v. United States, 
800 F.2d 393, 401 (4th Cir. 1986) ("It has been suggested that such cases can be 
distinguished on the ground that the assailant responsible for the actual assault and 
a battery was not a government employee .... The difficulty with such a distinction, 
however, is that the words 'arising out of assault [and] battery' in § 2680(h) must 
mean the same thing whether the assailant is a government employee or not"). See 
also Note, The Talismanic Language of Section 2680(h), supra note II, at 263 (call-
ing for legislative amendment and judicial action to recognize that assault and bat-
tery is a separate tort and a logically distinct claim from negligent supervision, and 
as such, the intentional tort exception should not bar claims of negligent supervi-
sion). Note, Assault and Battery Exception, supra note 15, at 817-22 (summarizing 
pitfalls of the employee/nonemployee approach). 
Supreme Court justices, regardless of whether they support a broad or narrow 
interpretation of the exception, also have rejected the employee/nonemployee dis-
tinction. In Sheridan v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2449 (1988), Justice Stevens, writ-
ing for the plurality, asserted that "the mere fact that [an assailant] happens to be an 
off-duty federal employee should not provide a basis for protecting the government 
from liability .... (I]t would seem perverse to exonerate the government because of 
the happenstance that [the assailant] was on a federal payroll." !d. at 2455. Justice 
O'Connor, writing for the dissent, took the same position although calling for the 
opposite result: "This analysis [rejecting governmental liability where the individ-
ual tortfeasor is more culpable than the negligent government employee] applies 
whether the person committing the intentional tort is a government employee, a 
nonemployee, or a government employee acting outside the scope of his office." !d. 
at 2460 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
27. Compare the plurality opinion in United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 55 (1985) 
("Section 2680(h) does not merely bar claims for assault and battery; in sweeping 
language it excludes any claim arising out of assault and battery. We read this pro-
vision to cover claims like respondent's that sound in negligence but stem from a 
battery committed by a government employee") (emphasis in original) with Doe v. 
United States, 838 F.2d 220, 223 (7th Cir. 1988) (rejecting government's assertion 
that any claim "tangentially related to an assault" is barred by section 2680(h) be-
cause "courts have long recognized that this language must be construed in light of 
the entire statute, to effect its purpose"). 
28. See Thigpen v. United States, 800 F.2d 393, 395 (4th Cir. 1986). 
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Other courts interpret the language broadly, barring claims for assault 
and battery, but permitting claims for negligent hiring, supervision or 
training of the intentional tortfeasor. 29 
In Thigpen v. United States, 30 suit was brought on behalf of two 
young girls who had been sexually molested by a Navy corpsman while 
they were convalescing from surgery in a military hospital. The suit as-
serted negligent supervision of the corpsman, who had previously pled 
guilty to a charge of indecency with a child. The government claimed 
immunity on the ground that the suit "arose out of" assaults or batteries. 
The Fourth Circuit held that the intentional tort exception to the waiver 
of sovereign immunity "erects a bar to all claims which rely on the exist-
ence of an assault or battery by a government employee," whether or not 
such conduct forms the sole basis for the claim. 31 
In a spirited concurring opinion, however, Judge Murnaghan ar-
gued that the claim did not "arise out of" an assault and battery since it 
was "based directly on the breach of a clear and recognizable affirmative 
duty, owed by the United States to the plaintiff, to protect the plaintiff 
from the harmful conduct of others."32 Judge Murnaghan reasoned that 
the category of claims "arising out of" assault and battery is 
properly limited to those where the liability of the United States 
would effectively be based on vicarious responsibility, through 
the doctrine of respondeat superior, for the violent act of an-
other. A claim does not "arise out of" an assault and battery 
where it is based directly on the breach of a clear and recogniz-
able affirmative duty, owed by the United States to the plaintiff, 
to protect the plaintiff from the harmful conduct of others. 33 
29. See Bennett v. United States, 803 F.2d 1502, 1504 (9th Cir. 1986). 
30. 800 F.2d 393 (4th Cir. 1986). 
31. /d. at 394. The court found persuasive the Supreme Court's opinion in United 
States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52 (1985), that the plain language of section 2680(h) 
"does not merely bar claims for assault and battery; in sweeping language it ex-
cludes any claim arising out of assault or battery. . . . [Section 2680(h) covers] 
claims ... that sound in negligence but stem from a battery committed by a Govern-
ment employee." /d. at 55. In Shearer, four Justices found that section 2680(h) 
barred an FTCA claim where the Army's negligence caused the plaintiff's son to be 
murdered by another serviceman. Four other Justices held the claim barred by the 
Feres doctrine and declined to join Chief Justice Burger's opinion on the intentional 
tort exception. /d. at 59-60. Justice Powell did not participate in the decision. /d. 
The Thigpen court reaffirmed the principle that "[t]he Federal Tort Claims Act 
... must be strictly construed in favor of the sovereign. Exceptions to such waivers, 
accordingly, receive a generous construction, with ambiguities resolved against 
those seeking recovery from the government." 800 F.2d at 394 (citation omitted). 
The court also found its prior decision in Hughes v. United States, 662 F.2d 219 
(4th Cir. 1981) controlling in barring the claims. The court interpreted Hughes as 
establishing that section 2680(h) "not only covers actual claims for assault and bat-
tery, as its broad language indicated, [but it] also bars any claim that depends on the 
existence of an assault and battery." 800 F.2d at 395. 
32. /d. at 398 (Murnaghan, J., concurring). 
33. /d. Judge Murnaghan nevertheless concurred in the judgment of the court, reason-
ing that the case fell within the Feres doctrine, which provides that "the Govern-
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Although Judge Murnaghan was unable to persuade his colleagues 
on the Fourth Circuit to limit the scope of the intentional tort exception, 
the Ninth Circuit adopted a position consistent with his analysis. In 
Bennett v. United States, 34 the court held that the intentional tort excep-
tion did not bar claims brought on behalf of children who had been sexu-
ally abused by a teacher, where the claimants could establish that the 
government was negligent in hiring the teacher and in permitting him to 
continue his employment. 3s 
The Bennett court relied to a great extent on its prior holding in 
Jablonski ex rei. Pahls v. United States, 36 where it held the intentional 
tort exception inapplicable to claims for injuries sustained in assaults or 
batteries which occur as the result of negligent government supervision 
of nonemployees. 37 In extending its holding to include negligent supervi-
sion of employees, the Ninth Circuit perceived no reason why victims of 
government employees should be treated differently than victims of non-
employees.38 Essentially, the court reasoned that it makes little sense to 
say that a negligence claim "arises out of" an assault when the perpetra-
tor is a federal employee, but that the same claim does not "arise out of" 
ment is not liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries to servicemen 
where the injuries arise out of activity incident to service." See Peres v. United 
States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950). The Supreme Court built upon the foundation of 
the Feres doctrine in United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52 (1985), where it held that 
sovereign immunity of the federal government is not waived where the claims in-
volve "sensitive military affairs at the expense of military discipline and effective-
ness." /d. at 59. 
34. 803 F.2d 1502 (9th Cir. 1986). 
35. /d. at 1503. The teacher, who was employed at a Bureau oflndian Affairs boarding 
school, had admitted on his employment application that he had been charged with 
a sex offense for which there was still a bench warrant outstanding. The govern-
ment never investigated the circumstances of the child molestation charge. The 
teacher was hired and placed in an Arizona school, where he kidnapped, assaulted, 
and raped several schoolchildren while off-duty. /d. at 1502-03. 
36. 712 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1983). 
37. See Bennett, 803 F.2d at 1503 (citing Jablonski ex rei. Pahls v. United States, 712 
F.2d 391, 395 (9th Cir. 1983) (government responsible for failure to protect patient 
at Veterans' Administration hospital from psychiatric patient with known criminal 
history)); see also Gibson v. United States, 457 F.2d 1391, 1395 (3d Cir. 1972) (gov-
ernment responsible for failure to protect Job Corps instructor from enrollee known 
to be juvenile delinquent and drug addict); Rogers v. United States, 397 F.2d 12, 15 
(4th Cir. 1968) (government responsible where probationer alleged that negligence 
by U.S. marshall allowed non-government employee with "unsavory reputation" to 
assault and torture probationer). 
38. Bennett, 803 F.2d at 1504. The court noted that distinguishing between employees 
and nonemployees results in a broad grant of immunity inconsistent with the 
FTCA's purpose of providing a forum for those injured by the government's negli-
gence. /d. The court noted further that 
[t]o construe the assault and battery exception to defeat claims based on 
negligence when the negligence amounts to almost reckless disregard in 
the hiring and the placement of a known sex offender in charge of children 
would violate 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1982) by treating the federal government 
differently from private entities hiring and supervising teachers. 
Bennett, 803 F.2d at 1504. 
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an assault when the perpetrator is a nonemployee. 39 In either case, the 
court explained, the appropriate focus is not on the status or conduct of 
the perpetrator, but on the negligence of the government in failing to 
supervise him, and claims arising from the latter do not "arise out of" 
assaults and batteries.40 
The opposite conclusions reached by the courts in Thigpen and Ben-
nett reflect two conflicting approaches to the intentional tort exception.41 
One approach permits recovery for injuries sustained in an assault or 
battery at the hands of a government employee, provided the theory of 
liability is premised upon negligent hiring, supervision or training.42 The 
second school of thought rejects liability in any case in which assault or 
battery by a government employee is essential to the claim.43 
The conflict between these two approaches was recently discussed 
39. /d. 
40. /d. 
41. There is, however, a consensus within the Supreme Court and accord among the 
circuits that the intentional tort exception does not bar claims "arising out of" as-
saults and batteries by nonemployees. See United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 56 
(1985); Doe v. United States, 838 F.2d 220, 221 (7th Cir. 1988); Wine v. United 
States, 705 F.2d 366, 367 (lOth Cir. 1983); Panella v. United States, 216 F.2d 622, 
626 (2d Cir. 1954) (Harlan, J.). 
In claims of negligent supervision of nonemployees, the claim against the gov-
ernment is based solely on its negligence. The absence of an employment relation-
ship removes the concern that a plaintiff could disguise a respondeat superior claim 
as a "negligent supervision" claim. Doe v. United States, 838 F.2d 220, 223 (7th 
Cir. 1988). But see Sheridan v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2449, 2460 (1988) (O'Con-
nor, J. dissenting) (rationale and intent of Congress to bar claims arising from inten-
tional torts because individual tortfeasor is more culpable applies regardless of 
whether tortfeasor is government employee, nonemployee or government employee 
acting outside the scope of employment). 
42. See, e.g., Bennett v. United States, 803 F.2d 1502, 1503 (9th Cir. 1986); Doe, 838 
F.2d at 223 (Section 2680(h) does not bar claim based on negligence in allowing 
unknown assailants to sexually molest children at Air Force day care center, where 
government affirmatively assumed duty to victims prior to assault, and govern-
ment's subsequent breach of duty caused victim's injury); Kearney v. United States, 
815 F.2d 535, 536 (9th Cir. 1987) (Section 2680(h) does not bar claim of negligent 
supervision resulting in sexual assault and murder by serviceman); Rogers v. United 
States, 397 F.2d 12, 15 (4th Cir. 1968) (Section 2680(h) does not bar claim based on 
negligence by United States marshall in allowing non-government employee to as-
sault and torture probationer); see also supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text. 
43. See Thigpen v. United States, 800 F.2d 393, 394 (4th Cir. 1986); Johnson v. United 
States, 788 F.2d 845, 852 (2d Cir.) (Section 2680(h) bars claim based on negligent 
supervision of postal worker who sexually assaulted child), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 
914 (1986); Satterfield v. United States, 788 F.2d 395, 399-400 (6th Cir. 1986) (Sec-
tion 2680(h) bars claim of negligent supervision and failure to warn resulting in 
death of serviceman by three fellow servicemen); Garcia v. United States, 776 F.2d 
116, 118 (5th Cir. 1985) (Section 2680(h) bars claim based on negligent supervision 
of military recruiter who sexually assaulted a potential recruit); Wine v. United 
States, 705 F.2d 366, 367 (lOth Cir. 1983) (Section 2680(h) bars claim based on 
negligent supervision of off-duty serviceman who shot and sexually assaulted plain-
tift); Hughes v. United States, 662 F.2d 219, 220 (4th Cir. 1981) (Section 2680(h) 
bars claim based on negligent retention of postal worker who sexually assaulted two 
young girls); see also supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text. 
484 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 18 
but not resolved by the Supreme Court in Sheridan v. United States. 44 
Sheridan involved a claim against the government arising from an assault 
by an enlisted off-duty medical aide. The aide had become intoxicated 
and was found unconscious by three Navy corpsmen. The corpsmen 
picked the aide up with the intention of taking him to a local emergency 
room. The corpsmen fled, however, when the aide regained conscious-
ness, grabbed a rifle and displayed its barrel. They took no further action 
to subdue the aide or to notify the proper authorities. Thereafter, the 
aide left the building and began shooting at passing cars, hitting the 
plaintiffs' vehicle and causing the plaintiff's injuries. 45 
A claim for negligent failure to control the aide was brought against 
the government. In reversing the decisions of the trial court and the 
Fourth Circuit in favor of the government,46 the Supreme Court found it 
unnecessary to adopt the view that any claim which asserts negligence as 
a basis for liability independent of assault should survive the intentional 
tort exception. 
Noting that the FTCA waives governmental immunity for negligent 
or wrongful acts of a government employee "acting within the scope of 
his office or employment,"47 the Court held that the aide's off-duty con-
duct was not within the scope of his employment and thus, could not by 
itself give rise to governmental liability under the FTCA.48 Because the 
off-duty conduct of the aide did not involve governmental liability under 
the FTCA, the intentional tort exception was inapplicable. The basis for 
the claim allowed by the Court was not the conduct of the aide, but 
instead, the independent negligent failure of the three corpsmen to con-
trol the aide. 49 
The impact of the Sheridan decision on the intentional tort excep-
tion remains unclear. Read broadly, the case appears to dictate that the 
government may be held liable for the negligent supervision of a govern-
44. 108 S. Ct. 2449. 
45. Id. at 2451. 
46. Both the Maryland District Court and the Fourth Circuit found the Fourth Cir-
cuit's prior decisions in Hughes and Thigpen applicable in barring the plaintiffs' 
claims. The Fourth Circuit held that the mere fact of government employment re-
quired dismissal. Sheridan v. United States, 823 F.2d 820, 822 (4th Cir. 1987), 
rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 2449 (1988). 
In a perceptive dissent, Chief Judge Winter argued that where, as here, "gov-
ernment liability is independent of the assailant's employment status," the in-
dependent tort of negligence does not "arise out of" the intentional tort of assault 
and battery. Sheridan, 823 F.2d at 824 (Winter, J., dissenting). 
47. Sheridan, 108 S. Ct. at 2455 (quoting Panella v. United States, 216 F.2d 622, 623 
(2d Cir. 1954)). 
48. Id. 
49. I d. This theory of liability emerged because of the Government's having voluntarily 
prohibited possession of firearms on the naval base and voluntarily undertaking re-
sponsibility for care of persons "visibly drunk and visibly armed," which in the 
Court's view, amounted to a Good Samaritan responsibility distinct from the em-
ployment relationship. Id. (citing Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 
65 (1955)). 
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ment employee who assaults another unless the assault occurs within the 
scope of government employment. Because few cases have involved as-
saults which truly have occurred within the scope of the wrongdoer's 
office or employment, a broad interpretation of Sheridan would virtually 
nullify the intentional tort exception and would make it unnecessary to 
resolve the conflict raised by Thigpen and Bennett. Conversely, if Sheri-
dan is confined to its facts, it may be interpreted to permit only negligent 
supervision claims arising out of assaults by off-duty personnel and 
would leave unsettled the conflict raised by Thigpen and Bennett. 50 
C. Future Expansion of the Intentional Tort Exception: Negligent 
Supervision as an Independent Basis for Liability. 
Insight into future Supreme Court treatment of the intentional tort 
exception may be found in the concurring and dissenting opinions in 
Sheridan. Three members of the Court-Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, 
and Scalia-dissented and would have held that where recovery is based 
upon injuries "associated in any way" with an assault and battery, the 
action "arises out of" that tort and is therefore barred.51 
Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment but faulted the Court's 
analysis. 52 In his view, application of the intentional tort exception 
should turn on whether the alleged negligence involved breach of a duty 
arising out of the employment relationship or breach of some separate 
duty independent of the employment relationship. If the breach arises 
out of the employment relationship, he concludes the claim should be 
barred. To hold otherwise, according to Justice Kennedy, "would frus-
trate the purposes of the exception" 53 since most intentional torts by gov-
ernment employees "plausibly could be ascribed to the negligence of the 
tortfeasor's supervisors."54 Conversely, Justice Kennedy would allow 
claims which allege negligence on the part of government personnel pro-
vided the negligence is independent of the employment relationship. 
In Sheridan, a legitimate theory of liability existed independent of 
the assailant's employment status. The theory of liability did not turn on 
the fact that the assailant was a government employee, and would have 
been equally sound had he been a patient or a visitor. In Justice Ken-
nedy's view, this distinction dictated a different result and he therefore 
concurred in the judgment of the majority. 55 The Court's focus in Sheri-
dan on a separate and independent basis for liability should be expanded 
to include such claims as negligent supervision. 
50. Under either reading, however, it is clear the Supreme Court has rejected the em-
ployee-nonemployee distinction lower courts have relied on in dismissing claims 
under the intentional tort exception. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
51. Sheridan, 108 S. Ct. at 2458-60 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
52. /d. at 2458 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy agreed with Judge Winter's 
dissent in Sheridan, 823 F.2d at 823-29. See also supra note 46. 
53. 108 S. Ct. at 2458. 
54. /d. 
55. /d. 
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D. Conclusion 
The parameters of the intentional tort exception are not yet fully 
defined. The diversity of opinion on the Supreme Court as to its proper 
scope creates future uncertainty. Nevertheless, Sheridan provides claim-
ants with hope for avoiding the intentional tort exception in future cases. 
III. CLAIMS ARISING IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY 
Congress has reserved to the federal government sovereign immu-
nity for claims "arising in a foreign country."56 Absent clear congres-
sional definition of the terms used in this statutory exception, however, 
courts not only have experienced difficulty determining whether a claim 
"arises" in a foreign country, but have interpreted the term "foreign 
country" broadly to include American military bases, 57 American em-
bassies, 58 areas leased to the United States, 59 land occupied or conquered 
by the United States during wartime,60 and any territory outside the geo-
graphic boundaries61 or political control of the United States.62 Judicial 
expansion of the foreign country exception has established jurisdictional 
limits far greater than intended by Congress, thus resulting in the dismis-
sal of valid claims contrary to the purposes and policies of the FTCA. 63 
56. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (1982) ("The provisions of (the Federal Tort Claims Act] shall 
not apply to ... [a]ny claim arising in a foreign country."). 
57. See Eaglin v. United States, 794 F.2d 981, 984 (5th Cir. 1986) (claim arose in Ger-
many because plaintiff's slip and fall claim arose on American military base in Ger-
many); see also infra notes 104, 107-110 and accompanying text. 
58. See Meredith v. United States, 330 F.2d 9, 10 (9th Cir.) (although words "foreign 
country" are not words of art carrying a fixed and precise meaning in every context, 
common sense dictates that an American embassy on foreign soil is a foreign coun-
try), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 867 (1964); see also infra note 103 and accompanying 
text. 
59. See United States v. Spelar, 338 U.S. 217, 219 (1949) (injury sustained on New-
foundland airfield leased to United States arose in foreign country); see also infra 
notes 89-100. 
60. See Cobb v. United States, 191 F.2d 604,608 (9th Cir. 1951) (Okinawa considered a 
foreign country notwithstanding United States sovereignty during World War II); 
see also infra notes 80-87, 102 and accompanying text. 
61. See Bell v. United States, 31 F.R.D. 32, 35 (D. Kan. 1962) (foreign country means 
all countries other than those within boundaries of United States, its territories and 
possessions). 
62. See Beattie v. United States, 756 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Antarctica not foreign 
country under plain meaning of FTCA because neither United States nor any other 
foreign nation asserts sovereignty over it); Pignataro v. United States, 172 F. Supp. 
151, 152 (C.D.N. Y. 1959) (foreign country is any territory subject to the sovereignty 
of another nation); Brunell v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 68, 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) 
(foreign country is any area not a "component part or political subdivision of the 
United States"); Straneri v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 340, 341 (E.D. Pa. 1948) 
(foreign country means anywhere the United States Congress is not the "supreme 
legislative body"). 
63. See, e.g., Eaglin v. United States, 794 F.2d 981, 984 (5th Cir. 1986) (court lacked 
jurisdiction over claim arising from a slip and fall at United States Army base in 
West Germany); Broadnax v. United States, 710 F.2d 865, 867 (D.C. Cir. 1983) 
(district court lacked jurisdiction over complaint alleging medical malpractice by 
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The United States Supreme Court decision in United States v. Spe-
lar64 is the only case in which the Supreme Court has addressed the for-
eign country exception since the FTCA's enactment in 1946. Since 
Spelar, however, lower courts have attempted to reach results consistent 
with the narrow outcome of Spelar without regard to the broader pur-
poses and policies of the FTCA and its exceptions. 
This section of the Article analyzes various lower court decisions 
interpreting the phrase "arising in a foreign country" and suggests that 
the most logical definition of the phrase "foreign country" is an area 
where United States law could not be applied.65 In those places where 
United States law could be applied, such as American military bases or 
embassies, the foreign country exception should be narrowly construed 
to allow suits to proceed. 
A. Historical Background of the Foreign Country Exception 
The FTCA and its exceptions were the product of numerous drafts 
and continuous debate for over twenty-seven years prior to its enactment 
in 1946.66 A 1940 Senate Judiciary Committee version of the bill would 
have limited the FTCA to "damages or injuries occurring within the geo-
graphic limits of the United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the 
Canal Zone."67. The same year, the House Judiciary Committee consid-
ered a draft limiting claims to those "arising in the United States or its 
territories."68 Two years later, a draft before the House Judiciary Com-
mittee exempted all claims "arising in a foreign country in behalf of an 
alien."69 Because the language of the 1942 draft would have "made the 
waiver of the government's traditional immunity turn upon the fortui-
tous circumstances of the injured party's citizenship,"70 the phrase "in 
United States Army doctors at Army hospital in Germany); Gerritson v. Vance, 488 
F. Supp. 267, 268 (D. Mass. 1980) (court lacked jurisdiction to review a claim aris-
ing from accident occurring on grounds of l!nited States embassy in Zambia). 
64. 338 u.s. 217 (1949). 
65. For other proposed definitions of the phrase "foreign country," see Bederman, Ex-
ploring the Foreign Country Exception: Federal Tort Claims in Antarctica, 21 VAND. 
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 731, 733 (1988) (the "only sensible definition of[foreign country] 
is one that emphasizes the presence or absence of another nation's tort law which 
effectively governs the claim") [hereinafter Bederman, Foreign Country Exception in 
Antarctica]; see also Comment, The Foreign Country Exception to the Federal Tort 
Claims Act, 22 LOY. L.A.L. REV. 603, 629 (1989) (the foreign country exception 
should be narrowly construed to prohibit cases arising under foreign law, rather 
than prohibiting those that arise in a foreign country in a strictly geographical 
sense) [hereinafter Comment, FTCA Foreign Country Exception]. 
66. See United States v. Spelar, 338 U.S. 217, 219-20 (1949) (FTCA was "the product of 
some 28 years of congressional drafting and redrafting, amendment and counter-
amendment"). 
67. See Tort Claims Against the U.S.: Hearings on S. 2690 Before the Senate Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 76 Cong., 3d Sess. 38, 65 (1940). 
68. See Tort Claims Against the United States: Hearings on H.R. 7236 Before Subcomm. 
No. 1 of the House Judiciary Comm., 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 3 (1940). 
69. H.R. REP. No. 5373, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. § 303(12) (1942). 
70. Spelar, 338 U.S. at 220. 
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behalf of an alien" was removed in a revised version of the bill at the 
request of the Attorney General,71 The enacted version, like the current 
version, merely contained the phrase "arising in a foreign country." 
The Supreme Court, in United States v. Spelar, 72 recognized that the 
legislative history of the foreign country exception demonstrates that, 
although "Congress was ready to lay aside a great portion of the sover-
eign's ancient and unquestioned immunity from suit, it was unwilling to 
subject the United States to liabilities depending upon the laws of a for-
eign power."73 The Court determined that the congressional purpose in 
reserving governmental immunity from suits arising in foreign countries 
was to protect the United States from being subject to the laws of another 
nation.74 Accordingly, the Court correlated the coverage of the Act with 
the scope of United States sovereignty. 
Although the legislative history, and the Supreme Court's interpre-
tation of the foreign country exception in Spelar, make clear that Con-
gress sought to protect the United States from liability arising from the 
laws of foreign powers, the legislative history fails to reveal a precise defi-
nition of the term "foreign country." In fact, Congress rejected earlier 
proposals to limit the scope of the FTCA to specific geographic areas 
such as the United States or its territories. 75 In rejecting these proposals, 
Congress instead adopted language designed to prevent the United States 
from being judged by the laws of a foreign country. ·unfortunately, Con-
gress did not define "foreign country" in carving out the exception, and 
the Supreme Court has relied on the amorphous concept of "sover-
eignty" in defining the exception's scope. 76 
71. See Tort Claims: Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463 Before the House Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 29, 35, 66 (1942). In support of dropping the 
phrase "in behalf of an alien," Assistant Attorney General Francis M. Shea told 
members of the House Judiciary Committee that 
[c]laims arising in a foreign country have been exempted from this bill ... 
whether or not the claimant is an alien. Since liability is to be determined 
by the law of the situs of the wrongful act or omission it is wise to restrict 
the bill to claims arising in this country. This seems desirable because the 
law of the particular State is being applied. Otherwise, it will lead I think 
a good deal of difficulty. 
/d. at 35 (quoted in Spelar, 338 U.S. at 221). 
72. 338 u.s. 217 (1949). 
73. Id. at 221. 
74. /d. 
75. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text. 
76. See Spelar, 338 U.S. at 223-24 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice Frankfurter 
noted: 
To assume that terms like "foreign country" and "possessions" are self-
defining, not at all involving a choice of judicial judgment, is mechanical 
jurisprudence at its best. These terms do not have fixed and inclusive 
meanings .... Both [terms] have penumbral meanings .... 
In the entangling relationships between ... nations ... it is not compelling 
that "foreign country" means today what it may have meant in the days of 
Chief Justice Marshall, or even in those of Mr. Justice Brown. The very 
concept of "sovereignty'' is in a state of more or less solution these days. 
To find a single and undeviating content for "foreign country" ... fails to 
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The lack of a clear definition of foreign country has left lower courts 
scrambling to apply the foreign country exception where the United 
States potentially could be exposed to the laws of foreign countries, 
rather than limiting the applicability of the foreign country exception to 
those cases where the United States would be exposed to the laws of a 
foreign country. Congressional waiver of sovereign immunity under the 
FTCA was the result of widespread awareness that, with limited excep-
tions, governmental immunity was not warranted either "as a matter of 
principle or as a matter of justice."77 By mechanically applying the for-
eign country exception to bar valid claims, courts have not shown an 
awareness of "justice."78 Rather, they have invoked the exception as a 
blanket refusal to consider FTCA claims even in the face of rapidly 
changing concepts of sovereignty, international relations, and interna-
tional law. 
B. Definition of "Foreign Country" 
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Spelar, 79 
lower courts sought to define "foreign country" broadly in order to 
achieve the stated congressional policy of reducing the United States gov-
ernment's exposure to suits in foreign countries. For example, in 
Straneri v. United States, 80 a federal district court held that a foreign 
country was anywhere the United States Congress was not the "supreme 
legislative body."81 Thus, to recover under the FTCA, "the tort must 
have been committed on lands within the boundaries of the United States 
or its territories or possessions. " 82 The Straneri court rejected a claim 
made by a merchant seaman who had been struck by a vehicle driven by 
a United States serviceman in Belgium, a country occupied by the United 
States Army at the time of the accident. The court reasoned that, be-
cause Congress did not have full power to enact laws under which 
Belgium and its people would be governed, Belgium was a foreign 
/d. 
recognize the scope of supple words that are the raw materials of legisla-
tion and adjudication and is unmindful of those considerations of policy 
which underlie, consciously or unconsciously, seemingly variant decisions. 
77. H.R. REP. No. 2428, 76 Cong., 3d Sess. 2, 8 (1940). 
78. For a discussion of the judicial deviation from the concepts of "justice" and "fair 
play" in deciding cases under the foreign country exception, see Comment, FTCA 
Foreign Country Exception, supra note 65, at 622-24. 
79. 338 u.s. 217 ( 1949). 
80. 77 F. Supp. 240 (E.D. Pa. 1948). 
81. /d. at 241. 
82. /d. The Court specified that, regardless of the degree of control exercised by the 
United States government, all lands other than the 48 States, the District of Colum-
bia, federal Indian reservations, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, 
the Canal Zone, Guam, Samoa and other Pacific Island possessions, are to be con-
sidered foreign countries for the purposes of the FTCA. !d. at 241 n.3. Interest-
ingly, this definition is almost identical to the one contained in an earlier draft of the 
Act which was rejected by Congress. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text. 
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country. 83 
Similarly, in Brunell v. United States, 84 a USO entertainer was in-
jured in Saipan while being transported in an Army jeep operated by a 
member of the United States Army. At the time of the accident, Saipan 
was in the possession and under the military control of the United States. 
Despite United States control of Saipan at the time, and the fact that 
Saipan was later made a trustee of the United States, the court "reluc-
tantly"85 concluded that Saipan was a foreign country within the provi-
sions of the FTCA. 86 The court reasoned that Congress intended the 
FTCA to apply only to those "areas which were actually a component 
part or political subdivision of the United States."87 
These two cases exemplify the overbroad definition of foreign coun-
try applied by courts in their resolve to achieve the congressional policy 
of avoiding the exposure of the United States to foreign laws. The 
Straneri and Brunell courts, however, adopted definitions of "foreign 
country" which Congress had explicitly rejected in revising the FTCA in 
1946.88 
Similarly, in United States v. Spelar, 89 the Supreme Court enunci-
ated an overbroad definition of foreign country based on the equally 
vague term "sovereignty," as that concept was understood in 1949. In 
Spelar, a flight engineer employed by American Overseas Airlines was 
killed in a takeoff crash at Harmon Field, Newfoundland. The airfield 
was one of several leased for ninety-nine years to the United States by 
Great Britain. Spelar's estate sued the United States under the FTCA 
alleging that the fatal crash was caused by the government's negligent 
operation of the airfield. 90 The district court held the claim to be one 
"arising in a foreign country," and dismissed the complaint for lack of 
jurisdiction. The Second Circuit reversed, holding that the foreign coun-
try exception did not bar a suit for wrongful death at an air base under 
long-term lease to the United States.91 The Supreme Court granted certi-
orari and held that the claim was barred by the foreign country 
83. Straneri, 77 F. Supp. at 241. 
84. 77 F. Supp. 68 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). 
85. /d. Other courts, while sympathizing with the plaintiff's plight, likewise have held 
that other FTCA exceptions barred a plaintiff's suit. See, e.g., Scales v. United 
States, 685 F.2d 970, 974 (5th Cir. 1982) (applying the Feres doctrine, "reluctantly," 
and "regret[ting] the effects" of the application). 
86. Brunell v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 68, 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). The court noted that, 
although foreign territory occupied by United States armed forces comes under the 
sovereignty of the United States, it does not in fact become part of the United States. 
/d. at 71. Thus, as under relevant revenue laws, neither military occupation nor 
cessation by treaty makes a conquered territory domestic territory, so long as Con-
gress has not incorporated the territory into the United States. /d. 
87. Id. at 72. 
88. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text. 
89. 338 u.s. 217 (1949). 
90. Id. at 218. 
91. !d. at 219. 
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exception. 92 
In barring the claim, the Court relied on two different rationales. 
First, the Court pointed to the plain meaning of the phrase "foreign 
country." Observing that "[w]e know of no more accurate phrase in 
common English usage than 'foreign country' to denote territory subject 
to the sovereignty of another nation,"93 Justice Reed, speaking for the 
majority, concluded that the claim was barred because the airfield 
"where this claim 'arose' remains subject to the sovereignty of Great 
Britain and lay within a 'foreign country.' "94 Second, the Court rea-
soned that the legislative history behind the foreign country exception 
did not support Spelar's claim. 95 In respecting Congress' unwillingness 
to subject the United States to "liabilities depending upon the laws of a 
foreign power," the Court held that "[t]he present suit, premised entirely 
upon Newfoundland's law, may not be asserted against the United States 
in contravention of that policy."96 
In reaching its decision, the Court distinguished its previous holding 
in Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 97 where it held that under the Fair 
Labor Standards Act (FLSA), the same airfield was a "possession" of the 
United States.98 These inconsistent results were rationalized by the 
Court with the explanation that the statutory language and legislative 
history of the FTCA were different from that of the FLSA. 99 In further 
rationalizing its decision to invoke the foreign country exception, the 
Court emphasized the concept of sovereignty and held that the lease of 
an air base by the United States from a foreign country does not result in 
the transfer of sovereignty. 100 
Relying on the legislative history and policies of the foreign country 
92. Id. 
93. Id. But see Spelar, 338 U.S. at 223-24 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (criticizing such 
a definitional explanation as simplistic). 
94. Id. at 219. 
95. Id. at 219-21; see also supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text. 
96. Spelar, 338 U.S. at 221. 
97. 335 u.s. 377 (1949). 
98. /d. at 390. 
99. See Spelar, 338 U.S. at 224-25 (Jackson, J., concurring). Justice Jackson reflected: 
If an employee should chance to work overtime on a leased air base, he 
can maintain an action for extra wages, penalties and interest, because the 
Court finds the air base to be a "possession" of the United States. How-
ever, if he is injured at the same place, he may not proceed under the Tort 
Claims Act to recover, because the Court finds the air base then to be a 
"foreign country." 
100. /d. at 221-22. The Court further dismissed any possible inconsistency by stating 
that in Vermilya-Brown "we there held no more than the word 'possessions' does 
not necessarily imply sovereignty .... " /d. at 222. Moreover, the leased bases were 
not in existence at the time the FLSA was passed. Therefore, Vermilya-Brown was 
viewed as an attempt to determine what Congress would have done if faced with the 
existence of the leased bases when it passed the Act. With regard to the FTCA 
foreign country exception, the Court stated that "the Vermilya-Brown problem of 
determining what Congress would have done when faced with a new situation does 
not exist at all in the present case." !d. 
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exception as enunciated in Spelar, courts uniformly expanded the mean-
ing of "foreign country," even as they sidestepped the concept of sover-
eignty the Supreme Court found so compelling in Spelar. 101 In the years 
following World War II, courts repeatedly denied jurisdiction over 
claims arising in areas occupied by the United States during wartime, 
even when the United States imposed its own laws and regulations dur-
ing its occupation and later assumed powers of administration through 
treaty or United Nations trusteeship. 102 
Courts also widened the scope of the foreign country exception by 
classifying embassies103 and military bases104 as foreign countries. 
Although there has been some recent liberalization of the foreign country 
exception to allow claims to proceed where the negligent act or omission 
occurred in the United States, 105 or in both the United States and a for-
eign country, 106 that liberalization has not taken place where the foreign 
country involved is a military base. 
101. See, e.g., Burna v. United States, 240 F.2d 720, 722 (4th Cir. 1957) (peace treaty 
with Japan did not amount to sovereignty); Cobb v. United States, 191 F.2d 604, 
608 (9th Cir. 1951) (Okinawa constituted a foreign country despite temporary 
United States sovereignty during World War II), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 913 (1952). 
102. See, e.g., Callas v. United States, 253 F.2d 838, 840 (2d Cir.) (Island of Kwajalein a 
foreign country despite United States' occupation and court system), cert. denied, 
357 U.S. 936 (1958); Burna v. United States, 240 F.2d 720, 721-22 (4th Cir. 1957) 
(Okinawa a foreign country because the United States, although exercising sover-
eignty, did not intend to retain territory permanently); Cobb v. United States, 191 
F.2d 604, 608 (9th Cir. 1951) (Okinawa a foreign country despite United States 
control because, although United States exercised de facto sovereignty, it lacked de 
jure sovereignty), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 913 (1952); Brunell v. United States, 77 F. 
Supp. 68, 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (Saipan a foreign country despite military occupation 
by United States). See generally Bederman, Foreign Country Exception in Antarc-
tica, supra note 65, at 742-45. 
103. See Meredith v. United States, 330 F.2d 9, 10 (9th Cir.) (United States Embassy in 
Bangkok, Thailand) ("Under Spelar, the words 'in a foreign country' ... must be 
read to include the embassy buildings and grounds or liability of the United States 
... will be determined by the law of a foreign power, contrary to the purposes of 
Congress."), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 867 (1964); Gerritson v. Vance, 488 F. Supp. 
267,268 (D. Mass. 1980) (court lacked jurisdiction over claim by plaintiff injured on 
grounds of United States embassy in Zambia). 
104. See Eaglin v. United States, 794 F.2d 981, 984 (5th Cir. 1986) (slip and fall claim in 
Germany); Heller v. United States, 776 F.2d 92, 95 (3d Cir. 1985) (negligent medi-
cal treatment of serviceman's wife at Air Force base in Philippines), cert. denied, 
476 U.S. 1105 (1986); Broadnax v. United States, 710 F.2d 865, 867 (D.C. Cir. 
1983) (medical malpractice in Germany); Grunch v. United States, 538 F. Supp. 
534, 537 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (negligent medical care in Germany); Bryson v. United 
States, 463 F. Supp. 908, 911 (E. D. Pa. I 978) (wrongful death claim in West Ger-
many); Roberts v. United States, 498 F.2d 520, 522 (9th Cir.) (wrongful death ac-
tion arising out of airplane crash in waters near United States air base in Okinawa), 
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1070 (1974); Manemann v. United States, 381 F.2d 704, 705 
(lOth Cir. 1967) (negligent medical care in Taiwan); Rafferty v. United States, 150 
F. Supp. 618, 618 (E.D. La. 1957) (medical malpractice claim occurring on military 
base in Germany). 
105. See infra notes 118-127 and accompanying text. 
106. See infra notes 123-127 and accompanying text. 
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In Heller v. United States, 107 for example, the wife of a U.S. service-
man was negligently treated by military doctors at an Air Force hospital 
on an American military base in the Philippines. Upon the couple's re-
turn to the United States, the serviceman's wife was diagnosed with in-
operable cancer which the military doctors had failed to detect. In a 
subsequent wrongful death action, the government was held immune 
from suit because the claim arose in a foreign country108 despite the ex-
tensive and near exclusive government control over the military 
installation. 109 
Although the Congressional purpose of protecting the United States 
from being judged in accordance with laws of foreign powers is an appro-
priate justification for implementing the foreign country exception, appli-
cation of the exception in many instances leads to incongruous results. 
For example, had the patient in Heller been treated in a stateside military 
hospital, the government could have been sued successfully. Only the 
accident of location protected the government in Heller from responsibil-
ity for the wrongful acts of its employees. Consequently, the govern-
ment's liability turned solely on the fortuity of the serviceman's 
assignment. 
In today's armed forces, the foreign country exception represents a 
bar to countless meritorious claims. Thousands of American service 
members are stationed overseas. For the most part, they live on Ameri-
can military installations run by the United States government in accord-
ance with federal laws. Their spouses and children live with them with 
the knowledge and approval of the United States government. They 
shop at stores owned and operated by the government, and they pay for 
goods with American currency. They seek medical treatment at military 
facilities run by American doctors in accordance with American stan-
dards. In short, overseas military installations are, in reality, enclaves of 
American sovereignty. Nevertheless, the foreign country exception re-
mains intact, barring all suits against the government which arise out of 
107. 776 F.2d 92 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1105 (1986). 
108. /d. at 96-97. In holding the suit came within the scope of the foreign country excep-
tion, the Third Circuit relied on the uniform holdings of other appellate courts that 
the exception applies to torts committed by military personnel stationed abroad. 
The court also interpreted Spelar as requiring two conditions for the exception to 
apply: first, the tort must occur in a jurisdiction outside United States sovereignty; 
second, the United States must be subject to liability based upon foreign law. /d. at 
95-96. 
109. /d. at 96. The court rejected the argument that "if the United States exercises any 
jurisdiction over its nationals in foreign countries, foreign sovereignty by definition 
could not exist." !d. Although the United States maintained sovereignty over its 
Philippine military bases after World War II, and by later agreement with the Phil-
ippine government, had retained "command and control over its facilities [and] per-
sonnel. .. " the court nonetheless found that the two Spelar conditions were satisfied. 
/d. n.3 (citing Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of 
the Philippines Concerning Military Bases, March 14, 1947, as amended January 7, 
1979, 30 U.S.T. 863, 879, T.I.A.S. No. 9224). 
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activities in foreign countries. 110 
C. Determining When a Claim "Arises in" a Foreign Country 
In order to determine whether the foreign country exception applies, 
courts must decide where the claim arose. 111 Under the FTCA, a tort 
claim "arises" where the alleged negligent act or omission "occurred."112 
In Richards v. United States, 113 the Supreme Court held that liability 
under the FTCA is decided under the law of the place where the negli-
gent act or omission occurs, not the law of the site of the injury or the 
place where the negligence has its "operative effect." 114 Therefore, 
where a negligent act t!lkes place in a foreign country, but results in an 
injury in the United States, the claim "arises in a foreign country" and is 
barred by the foreign country exception. 115 If, however, the negligent act 
occurs in the United States, even though the act had its "operative effect" 
in a foreign country, the claim does not fall within the foreign country 
exception. 116 
Judicial construction of the foreign country exception generally has 
centered on the meaning of "arising in," and not on the definition of a 
foreign country. Courts have focused on where the negligent act or omis-
sion occurred, not whether the injury took place on foreign soil. 117 Typi-
cally, the plaintiff will concede that the injury occurred in a foreign 
country; what remains in dispute, however, is the characterization of the 
negligent "act or omission/' and the determination of where such negli-
gence took place. 
In In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974,l18 a federal district court 
held that the foreign country exception did not bar claims against the 
United States for deaths resulting from an airplane crash in France. Ac-
cording to the court, all of the alleged negligent conduct, whether acts or 
omissions, took place in California. Thus, the plaintiffs' claims arose in 
110. Although Congress has retained its immunity from claims arising in foreign coun-
tries, it has created administrative remedies which arguably take some sting out of 
the foreign country exception. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. §§ 2731-2737 (1982) (providing 
for settlement of claims for property loss, personal injury or death) 
111. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (1982), which provides in pertinent part that "[t]he provi-
sions of this chapter and § 1346(b) of [the FTCA] shall not apply to [a]ny claim 
arising in a foreign country." (emphasis supplied). 
112. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982), which provides that "[t]he district courts ... shall 
have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States ... in 
accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." 
113. 369 U.S. I (1962). 
114. /d. at 9-10. 
115. See Manemann v. United States, 381 F.2d 704, 705-06 (lOth Cir. 1967) (medical 
malpractice committed in Taiwan, but resulting in an injury in the United States, 
barred). 
116. See Sami v. United States, 617 F.2d 755, 761-63 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (claim against 
United States arising from message sent by United States liaison with Interpol, re-
sulting in wrongful detention of plaintiff by German officials, not barred). 
117. See id. at 761-62; see also Beattie v. United States, 756 F.2d 91, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
118. 399 F. Supp. 732 (C.D. Cal. 1975). 
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California, where the government's alleged negligence occurred, rather 
than in France, where the injury took place. 119 · 
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit in Leaf v. United States 120 held that, 
although the loss occurred in Mexico, the claim did not arise in a foreign 
country because the negligent acts occurred in California and Arizona. 121 
In Leaf, a Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) informant, acting with the 
consent of DEA agents, leased a plane from the plaintiffs in California. 
The informant and a suspected drug smuggler took the plane to Arizona 
and then to Mexico. The plane was damaged in an aborted takeoff 
caused by the excess weight of an illegal marijuana cargo. The plane was 
then sunk in a reservoir in Mexico to prevent the police from finding it. 
The plaintiff alleged that negiigent acts by the government in California 
and Arizona relating to the planning and execution of the DEA opera-
tion, and its failure to disclose the true purpose of the plane lease, proxi-
mately caused the damage to their plane. The Ninth Circuit held that 
the claim arose in California, where the plane was leased, and in Arizona, 
where the plane flew before going to Mexico, rather than in Mexico, 
where the loss occurred. 122 
Finally, in Glickman v. United States, 123 a federal district court" held 
that the foreign country exception did not bar a suit filed by an American 
who alleged that, while he was in Paris in 1952, Central Intelligence 
Agency agents secretly gave him LSD in an experiment. In support of its 
holding, the court reasoned that, although certain activities implement-
ing the program to administer the drugs were carried out in France, the 
program originated, was designed, and was set in operation in the United 
States. 124 Thus, the court concluded that the plaintiff's claim arose in 
the United States, where the negligent acts proximately causing the 
plaintiff's injuries occurred. 125 
In re Paris Air Crash, Leaf, and Glickman stand for the proposition 
that courts will not exempt the United States from liability for acts or 
omissions occurring in the United States even though their operative ef-
fects occur in other countries. These claims are commonly referred to as 
"headquarters claims." 126 These cases support the central FTCA goal of 
waiving governmental immunity in the interest of fair play and justice. 
Moreover, the cases do not conflict with the Act's underlying policy of 
avoiding the risk of exposing the United States to unreasonable liability 
under foreign law. As one court noted, such a policy consideration "has 
little bearing on a case where the acts or omissions complained of oc-
curred in [the United States] because in such cases liability will be deter-
119. !d. at 737. 
120. 588 F.2d 733 (9th Cir. 1978). 
121. !d. at 735. 
122. !d. 
123. 626 F. Supp. 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
124. Id. at 174. 
125. !d. 
126. See Beattie v. United States, 756 F.2d 91, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
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mined under [United States] law." 127 Where the nexus or connection 
between the injury and the negligence is too remote, however, courts 
have denied headquarters claims. 128 
In Cominotto v. United States, 129 the Ninth Circuit dismissed a 
claim because the plaintiff had failed to establish a proximate connection 
between the alleged negligence in the United States and the resulting 
damage in Thailand. The plaintiff, a DEA informant, was solicited by 
the Secret Service to assist in an undercover counterfeiting operation. 
The plaintiff first met Secret Service agents in California, and then again 
in Honolulu, Manila, and Malaysia. The plaintiff was shot in the leg by 
suspected counterfeiters during an undercover operation in Thailand. 
The plaintiff's headquarters claim alleged that the United States govern-
ment had been negligent in planning the Thailand investigation. 130 
The court acknowledged that headquarters claims are available to 
FTCA plaintiffs when negligent acts in the United States proximately 
cause harm in a foreign country. 131 Here, however, the plaintiff had 
failed to establish proximate cause, because the facts indicated that the 
plaintiff's violation of Secret Service instructions, and his subsequent at-
tempt to escape from the dangerous situation in which he had placed 
himself, was the sole and proximate cause of his injuries. 132 Thus, the 
court concluded that the plaintiff "broke any chain of causation which 
might have existed between Secret Service activities in the United States 
and [the plaintiff's actions and resulting injury] in Thailand." 133 
Similarly, in Eaglin v. United States, 134 the Fifth Circuit held that 
the plaintiff's headquarters claim was barred because the plaintiff had 
failed to show a causal nexus between the alleged negligence in the 
United States and the injury in West Germany. In Eaglin, the plaintiff 
was a civilian dependent from Louisiana living on a United States Army 
base in West Germany. While on her way to a required exercise, she 
slipped and fell on a patch of "black ice" on the base. Eaglin sued the 
government for negligently failing to inform her while she was in the 
United States about the weather hazards she would encounter in West 
Germany, and for negligently failing to instruct her in how to discover or 
avoid those hazards. 135 
In dismissing the claim, the Fifth Circuit held that the connection 
between the plaintiff's injury in West Germany a:p.d any act or omission 
by military personnel in the United States was too tenuous and re-
127. Sami v. United States, 617 F.2d 755, 763 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
128. See Cominotto v. United States, 802 F.2d 1127, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 1986); Eaglin v. 
United States, 794 F.2d 981, 983-84 (5th Cir. 1986). 
129. 802 F.2d 1127 (9th Cir. 1986). 
130. /d. at 1129. 
131. /d. at 1130 (citing Leaf v. United States, 588 F.2d 733, 736 (9th Cir. 1978)). 
132. /d. 
133. /d. 
134. 794 F.2d 981 (5th Cir. 1986). 
135. /d. at 982. 
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mote. 136 The court found that there was no negligent act performed in 
the United States that directly caused the plaintiff's injury in West 
Germany. 137 
While the issue of proximate cause may prove to be a stumbling 
block in raising a headquarters claim, recent lower court decisions indi-
cate that courts are willing to separate negligent acts or omissions occur-
ring in the United States from those occurring in foreign countries and to 
provide compensation for injuries resulting from the former. 138 In Voge-
laar v. United States, 139 for example, a federal district court held that 
when a plaintiff alleges several negligent acts or omissions, those occur-
ring in the United States are actionable even if those occurring in a for-
eign country are barred by the foreign country exception. 140 
In Vogelaar, the mother of a serviceman killed in Vietnam sued the 
government for its failure to properly investigate the circumstances of 
her son's disappearance, to properly care for his remains, and to timely 
identify and deliver her son's remains. The serviceman had been listed as 
a deserter until his remains were discovered, approximately two years 
after his death, on the site of the base where he had been stationed. The 
court looked separately at the three omissions alleged by the plaintiffs 
and found that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the first 
two because they occurred in Vietnam. 141 The court, !10wever, found 
that the third omission-that of failing to timely identify and deliver her 
son's remains--occurred at a military center in Indiana. The court, 
therefore, allowed the plaintiff's claim for the negligent omission which 
occurred in Indiana.t42 
The federal district court for the Eastern District of New York 
reached a similar conclusion in In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability 
Litigation. 143 In that case, Vietnam veterans and members of their fami-
lies brought a products liability class action suit to recover damages for 
injuries allegedly sustained as a result of veterans' exposure to Agent Or-
136. /d. at 984. The court stated that "were we to adopt a 'headquarters' exception to 
section 2680(k) for the foreign nation results of negligent training or supervision 
conducted in the United States ... the nexus between [the claim of negligence] in 
the United States is simply too tenuous and remote." /d. The court also relied on 
the Supreme Court's recent limitation on the ability of plaintiffs to avoid jurisdic-
tional issues under the FfCA by splitting a cause of action. See United States v. 
Shearer, 473 U.S. 52 (1985). 
137. Eaglin, 794 F.2d at 984. ("If black ice is peculiar to, or common in, West Germany, 
then the obvious place to warn the servicemen and their dependents of this danger is 
in West Germany, not in Louisiana."). 
138. See infra notes 139-152 and accompanying text. But see Grunch v. United States, 
538 F. Supp. 534, 537 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (where act of negligence which allegedly 
took place in the United States, flowed directly from acts occurring in West Ger-
many, entire claim is barred by foreign country exception). 
139. 665 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Mich. 1987). 
140. /d. at 1302. 
141. /d. at 1300. 
142. /d. at 1307. 
143. 580 F. Supp. 1242 (E.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 745 F.2d 161 (2d Cir. 1984). 
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ange in Vietnam. The chemical companies impleaded the United States. 
The court determined that, although there were many negligent acts in 
both the United States and Vietnam which contributed to the veterans' 
injuries, there was no policy reason to bar the claims under the foreign 
claim exception. 144 After applying a headquarters claim analysis, the 
court found it "undisputed that the initial decision to use Agent Orange, 
the decision to continue using it, and decisions relating to the specifica-
tions for Agent Orange were made in [the United States.]" 145 The court 
noted also that, while it was unclear whether alleged government misuse 
of Agent Orange took place in the United States or Vietnam, there was 
no reason to attribute such acts or omissions to Vietnam rather than to 
the United States.I46 
The Agent Orange analysis was adopted by the Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit in Beattie v. United States. 147 In Beattie, 
a plane crashed into Mount Erebus, Antarctica, killing all persons on 
board. In an action for wrongful death under the FTCA, the plaintiffs 
alleged negligence by United States air traffic controllers at McMurdo 
Naval Air Station, Antarctica. Plaintiffs also alleged negligence by De-
partment of Defense officials in the selection, training, and supervision of 
Navy personnel at McMurdo Base. 148 
As in Agent Orange, the court was presented with an undetermined 
mix of acts and omissions, some occurring within the United States and 
others in Antarctica. 149 In holding that the foreign country exception 
did not bar the plaintiffs' claims, the court accepted the proposition that 
Section 2680(k) "is not a bar to jurisdiction over cases arising at least in 
part outside the United States, and in areas where there is no theoretical 
justification for application of foreign law." 150 In its decision, the court 
separated the claims arising from negligence at McMurdo Base (Antarc-
tica claims) and the claims arising from negligence in the United States 
(headquarters claims). 151 The court then determined that the headquar-
144. /d. at 1255. The court did find, however, that the servicemens' and derivative fam-
ily members' claims were barred by the Feres doctrine, id. at 1247, and could be 
barred by the discretionary function exception. /d. at 1255-56. The court did allow 
the independent claims of the servicemens' wives and children to go forward. /d. at 
1254. 
145. Id. at 1255. 
146. /d. 
147. 756 F.2d 91, 98 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
148. /d. at 93. 
149. /d. at 96. The court held that the headquarters claims consisted of the allegations of 
negligent selection, training, and supervision of the McMurdo Air Traffic Control-
lers by officials in Washington, D.C. Since these claims alleged negligent acts or 
omissions by government employees which occurred within the United States, and 
which merely had their operative effect in Antarctica, the claims did not arise in a 
foreign country. /d. 
150. /d. (quoting In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 1242, 1254) 
(E.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 745 F.2d 161 (2d Cir. 1984)). 
151. /d. The court also allowed the Antarctica claims to proceed, holding that Antarc-
tica was not a foreign country under the FTCA. /d. at 94. 
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ters claims-based on allegations of negligent selection, training, and su-
pervision of McMurdo Air Traffic Controllers by officials in Washington, 
D.C.-were not barred by the foreign country exception because they did 
not "arise in" a foreign country. 152 
D. Conclusion 
The broad definitions of "foreign country" and "arising in" often 
used by courts to dismiss FTCA claims should be more narrowly con-
strued to achieve the central FTCA policy of fairness and justice. Specif-
ically, American embassies and military bases abroad should not be 
considered foreign countries under the FTCA. While it is true that these 
facilities are on foreign soil; they are nonetheless enclaves of American 
sovereignty. As such, members of these communities should be granted 
the same waiver of governmental immunity enjoyed by Americans living 
in the United States. 
The recent expansion of headquarters claims, for acts or omissions 
which take place, in whole or in part, in the United States, is a step in the 
right direction. Fears that such an expansion would lead to a flood of 
FTCA claims sidestepping the foreign country exception153 have not 
been realized. 154 Allowing claims to go forward if any governmental 
negligence took place in the United States strikes the proper balance be-
tween the policies behind both the FTCA and the foreign country 
exception. 
Rather than focusing on a broad definition of "foreign country," 
courts should look at claims to see if they arise, in whole or in part, in the 
United States. Upon an affirmative showing, plaintiffs should be permit-
ted to seek redress for their injuries. The fortuitous circumstance of loca-
tion should not bar suits where United States law could be applied and 
the United States would not be subject to the laws of a foreign power. 
IV. CLAIMS ARISING UNDER THE FERES DOCTRINE 
Although members of the armed forces stationed abroad may find 
their FTCA claims barred by the foreign country exception, service 
members stationed in the United States may find their claims barred by 
the judicially-created exception enunciated by the Supreme Court in 
Feres v. United States. 155 The Feres doctrine bars all service member 
claims for injuries "incident to service." 156 Prior to the Court's enuncia-
152. /d. at 96. The court reasoned that "[s]ince these claims allege negligent acts or 
omissions by government employees which occur within the United States, and 
which merely had their operative effect in Antarctica, they are not claims which 
'arise in' a foreign country." /d. 
153. See Beattie v. United States, 756 F.2d 91, 119 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
154. See Bederman, Foreign Country Exception in Antarctica, supra note 65, at 737. 
155. 340 u.s. 135 (1950). 
156. /d. at 146. While the Supreme Court chose to create a much broader service mem-
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tion of the Feres doctrine, lower courts barred service member claims 
only if they fell within a narrow construction of 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j), 157 
the "combatant activities" exception to the FTCA. 158 
Although the Feres doctrine has been severely criticized by courts 
and commentators, 159 the Supreme Court has appeared unwilling to limit 
its application or to overrule it entirely. Recent alignments within the 
Court, however, and the appointment of Justices who have shown an 
inclination to restrict Feres, provide hope that the FTCA soon will be a 
true waiver of immunity for service members. 160 
ber exception than that enacted by Congress, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j) (1982), the Court 
failed to clearly define the phrase "incident to service," or provide a clear, explicit 
set of standards or guidelines for lower courts to follow in applying the Feres 
doctrine. 
157. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j) (1982). This exception reserves governmental immunity for 
"[a]ny claim arising out of the combatant activities of the military or naval forces, 
or the Coast Guard, during time of war." 
158. See, e.g., Employer's Fire Ins. Co. v. United States, 167 F.2d 655, 657 (9th Cir. 
1948) (FTCA should not be narrowed by judicial construction to exclude claims); 
Skeels v. United States, 72 F. Supp. 372, 374 (W.D. La. 1947) (combat activities 
exception contemplates actual warfare or conflict, nor mere practice or training 
away from the zone of combat during time of war); Wojciuk v. United States, 74 F. 
Supp. 914, 916 (E.D. Wis. 1947) (FTCA claims not expressly excluded from the 
operation of the Act must be held to have been intended to be included). 
159. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 700 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting, 
joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, J.J.) ("Feres was wrongly decided and 
heartily deserves the 'widespread, almost universal criticism' it has received.") (cita-
tions omitted) (quoting In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 550 F. Supp. 1242, 
1246 (E.D.N.Y.) appeal dismissed 745 F.2d 161 (2d Cir. 1984); Hinkie v. United 
States, 715 F.2d 96, 97 (3d Cir. 1983) ("We are forced once again to decide a case 
where 'we sense the injustice ... of [the] result'") (citation omitted) (quoting Peluso 
v. United States, 474 F.2d 605,606 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 879 (1973)), cert. 
denied, 465 U.S. 1023 (1984); Scales v. United States, 685 F.2d 970, 974 (5th Cir. 
1982) (applying Fe res "reluctantly" and "regret[ting] the effects" of the conclusion); 
Hunt v. United States, 636 F.2d 580, 589 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("The Feres doctrine 
clearly lives, although its theoretical bases remain subject to serious doubt."); Veil-
lette v. United States, 615 F.2d 505, 506 (9th Cir. 1980) (applying Feres "reluc-
tantly"); Peluso v. United States, 474 F.2d 605, 606 (3d Cir.) ("If the matter were 
open to us we would be responsive to the appellants' argument that Feres should be 
reconsidered"), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 879 (1973); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. 
Litig., 580 F. Supp. 1242, 1247 (E.D.N.Y.) ("Perhaps a pathbreaking appellate 
court might discern enough emanations of Supreme Court disquiet to predict that 
Court's future conduct in limiting Feres"), appeal dismissed, 745 F.2d 161 (2d Cir. 
1984); see also Schwartz, Making Intramilitary Tort Law More Civil: A Proposed 
Reform of the Feres Doctrine, 95 YALE L.J. 992, 992-99 (1986) [hereinafter 
Schwartz, A Proposed Reform of the Feres Doctrine]; Bennett, The Feres Doctrine, 
Discipline and the Weapons of War, 29 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 383, 385 (1984); Rhodes, 
The Feres Doctrine After Twenty-Five Years, 18 A.F. L. REV. 24, 40-43 (1976); 
Hitch, The Federal Tort Claims Act and Military Personnel, 8 RUTGERS L. REV. 
· 316 (1954); Note, Servicemembers' Rights Under the Feres Doctrine: Rethinking 
"Incident to Service" Analysis, 33 VILL. L. REV. 175, 176 n.7 (1988) [hereinafter 
Note, Rethinking "Incident to Service" Analysis]; Note, From Feres to Stencel: 
Should Military Personnel Have Access to FTCA Recovery?, 77 MICH. L. REv. 1099, 
1099-1100 ( 1979). 
160. A full discussion of the claims of service members' families is beyond the scope of 
this Article. See generally Comment, The Feres Doctrine: Has It Created Remedi-
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A. Pre-Feres "Incident to Service" Approach: Military Status Alone 
Does Not Bar FTCA Recovery 
Shortly after the FTCA was enacted, the Supreme Court considered 
whether military service members could recover under the Act for non-
wartime injuries. In Brooks v. United States, 161 two servicemen and their 
father were struck by a United States Army truck while driving on a 
North Carolina highway. One of the servicemen was killed; the other 
two men were seriously injured. The two survivors, and the estate of the 
deceased, brought suit against the United States under the FTCA. 162 
The Supreme Court deemed the suits proper after concluding that there 
was no applicable exception barring suits for injury or death by members 
of the armed forces not incident to military service. 163 
In reaching its decision, the Court noted that, if Congress had in-
tended "any claim" to mean "any claim but that of servicemen," it 
less Wrongs for Relatives of Servicemen?, 44 U. Prrr. L. REv. 929 (1983); Note, 
Pushing the Feres Doctrine a Generation Too Far: Recovery for Genetic Damage to 
the Children of Servicemembers, 32 AM. U.L. REv. 1039 (1983); Note, If You Can't 
Save Us, Save Our Families: The Feres Doctrine and Servicemen's Kin, 1983 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 317. 
Briefly, the claims of family members of a service member have been barred 
when those claims are for injuries suffered by that service member "incident to [mil-
itary] service." See, e.g., DeFont v. United States, 453 F.2d 1239, 1240 (1st Cir.) 
(wife cannot sue the United States for wrongful death of serviceman-husband, even 
though her claim is independent of husband's estate, because husband would be 
barred under Peres from suing if he had survived), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 910 (1972). 
Family member claims have been permitted, however, when they are for independ-
ent injuries, even when a service member-family member is also injured in the same 
accident, and whose claim is therefore barred by Peres. See, e.g., Orken v. United 
States, 239 F.2d 850, 850 (6th Cir. 1956) (estate of wife and children of serviceman, 
· all killed when Air Force plane crashed into their home on military base, could 
bring suit against the United States for wrongful death, notwithstanding that suit 
for wrongful death of serviceman-husband was barred by Peres). 
Courts recently have addressed the more difficult question of whether Peres 
bars the independent claims of service members' wives and children for their own 
direct injuries resulting from service members' exposure to radiation during and 
after World War II, or exposure to the herbicide Agent Orange in Vietnam. See, 
e.g., Hinkie v. United States, 715 F.2d 96, 98 (3d Cir. 1983) (barring claims of ser-
viceman's family members for injuries allegedly caused by serviceman's exposure to 
radiation during active duty), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1021 (1984); Mondelli v. United 
States, 711 F.2d 567, 569-70 (3d Cir. 1983) (same), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1021 
(1984); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 1242, 1247-54 
(E.D.N.Y.) (allowing independent claims for children's genetic injuries and birth 
defects and wives' miscarriages caused by service members' exposure to Agent Or-
ange to go forward), appeal dismissed, 745 F.2d 161 (2d Cir. 1984). 
161. 337 u.s. 49 (1949). 
162. The district court entered judgment against the government in favor of all three 
plaintiffs. The government did not contest the father's judgment. /d. at 50. On 
appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the two brothers were in the 
armed forces at the time of the crash, and were therefore barred from recovery. 
United States v. Brooks, 169 F.2d 840, 846 (4th Cir. 1948), rev'd, 337 U.S. 49 
(1949). 
163. Brooks, 337 U.S. at 51. 
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would have made that intent clear by a separate exception. 164 Although 
Congress listed twelve exceptions to the Act, none explicitly excluded 
service member claims for injuries not arising out of wartime activi-
ties.165 Finally, the Court found support for its decision in the Act's leg-
islative history, which implied that Congress had considered, and 
rejected, a specific exception barring all suits by members of the armed 
forces. 166 
According to the Brooks Court, military status alone does not bar 
FTCA recovery; only suits arising from actions "incident to service" may 
be barred. 167 Unfortunately, the Court was not clear in defining the term 
"incident to service." Moreover, the Court undermined its own interpre-
tation of Congress' intent. In dictum, the Court noted that interpretation 
of "incident to service" may vary with the consequences, because "those 
consequences may provide insight for determination of congressional 
purpose." 168 The Court speculated that the "dire consequences" envi-
sioned by the govemment169 if service members' suits were allowed may 
reflect congressional intent to bar such claims, despite the Act's "literal 
language and other considerations to the contrary." 170 Because the 
Court concluded that Brooks did not involve service members injured 
"incident to service," it left the interpretational problems of this phrase 
for another day. 
B. The Peres Doctrine: "Incident to Service" Expanded 
That day came with the Supreme Court's decision in Feres v. United 
States. 171 In Feres, the Court consolidated three cases for review, all of 
which raised similar issues. 172 The lead case arose out of the fiery death 
164. /d. The Court observed that "[i]t would be absurd to believe that Congress did not 
have the servicemen in mind in 1946, when this statute was passed. The overseas 
and combatant activities exceptions make this plain." /d. 
165. /d. In particular, the Court noted the foreign country and combatant activities 
exception. 
166. /d. at 51-52. The Court noted that, of the 18 versions of the bills introduced in 
Congress between 1925 and 1935, 16 had exceptions denying recovery to service 
members. Yet, in all bills introduced after 1935, including the current version, "the 
exception concerning servicemen had been dropped." /d. at 52. 
167. /d. "[W]e are dealing with an accident which had nothing to do with the Brooks' 
army careers, injuries not caused by their service except in the sense that all human 
events depend upon what has already transpired. Were the accident incident to the 
Brooks' service, a wholly different case would be presented." /d. (emphasis added). 
168. /d. 
169. "A battle commander's poor judgment, an army surgeon's slip of hand, a defective 
jeep which causes injury, all would ground tort actions against the United States." 
/d. 
170. /d. at 53. 
171. 340 U.S. 135 (1950). 
172. Feres v. United States, 177 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1949), a.ff'd, 340 U.S. 135 (1950); 
Jefferson v. United States, 178 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1949), a.ff'd sub nom. Feres v. 
United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950); United States v. Griggs, 178 F.2d 1 (lOth Cir. 
1949), rev'd sub nom. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950). 
In Feres, a serviceman was killed in a fire in his barracks while on active duty. 
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of a serviceman, allegedly as a consequence of the government's decision 
to quarter him in barracks which were known to be a fire hazard. 173 The 
other two cases arose out of allegedly negligent medical treatment pro-
vided to active duty personnel. 174 The plaintiffs in each case sought re-
covery under the FTCA. 
The Feres Court read into the FTCA a new, unstated exception to 
the waiver of sovereign immunity contrary to the explicit terms of the 
FTCA. The Court held that the government "is not liable under the 
[FTCA] for injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in 
the course of activity incident to service." 175 Because each of the individ-
uals on behalf of whom suit was brought sustained injuries "while on 
active duty and not on furlough," 176 the claims were deemed incident to 
military service and thus barred. 
In reaching its decision, the Court rejected three arguments in favor 
of allowing recovery by service members for injuries sustained while in 
the armed forces but not in the line of active duty: first, that the Act 
provides for suits alleging negligence of military personnel, because it 
defines "employee of the government" to include "members of the mili-
tary or naval forces of the United States"; 177 second, that under maxims 
of statutory interpretation, the existence of express exceptions, particu-
larly the combatant exception, 178 means that no additional exceptions 
should be implied; 179 and finally, that the legislative history of the Act, as 
His estate sued the government for negligence in housing him in barracks known or 
which should have been known to be unsafe because of a defective heating plant, 
and in failing to maintain an adequate fire watch. The district court dismissed the 
case and the Second Circuit affirmed. Feres, 340 U.S. at 136-37. 
In Jefferson v. United States, 178 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1949), aff'd sub nom. 
Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950), a serviceman sued the government for 
medical malpractice. The serviceman, while in the Army, underwent an abdominal 
operation, during which a towel, two and one-half feet long by one and one-half feet 
wide, marked "Medical Department U.S. Army," was found in his stomach. The 
district court dismissed the claim after concluding as a matter of law that the FTCA 
did not cover service-connected disabilities occurring while the plaintiff was en-
listed. Jefferson, 77 F. Supp. at 711. The Fourth Circuit affirmed after concluding 
that Congress had not intended that courts question the "propriety of military deci-
sions and actions" by allowing the claims of service members under the FTCA. 
Jefferson, 178 F.2d at 520. 
In the third case, United States v. Griggs, 178 F.2d 1 (lOth Cir. 1949), rev'd sub 
nom. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950), the Tenth Circuit held that the 
estate of an Army officer could recover under the FTCA for wrongful death caused 
by the negligence of members of the Army Medical Corps. Griggs, 178 F.2d at 3. 
173. Feres, 340 U.S. at 137. 
174. /d. 
175. /d. at 146. 
176. /d. at 138. 
177. /d. Therefore, suits of negligence by military personnel against other military per-
sonnel were within the contemplation of the Act. 
178. 28 u.s.c. § 2680(j) (1982). 
179. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 138 (1949). The existence of a wartime com-
batant activities exception could be said to imply allowance of claims by service 
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discussed in Brooks, 180 and the Brooks opinion itself, support allowing 
suits by service members against the government where the injuries do 
not arise from actual combat. 181 The Court rejected all three arguments 
and offered three rationales in support of its decision. 182 
First, the Court noted the lack of a parallel private liability for torts 
committed by military personnel of the armed forces. 183 The FTCA pro-
vides that the United States will be liable "in the same manner and to the 
same extent as a private individual under like circumstances." 184 The 
Court could find no private liability "even remotely analogous" to the 
liability asserted by service members against the government. 185 More-
over, the Court noted that, because "no private individual has power to 
conscript or mobilize a private army," there can be no parallel liability 
"under like circumstances." 186 In the absence of such parallel private 
liability, and in the absence of any American law "permitt[ing] a soldier 
to recover for negligence, against either his superior officers or the gov-
ernment he is serving," the Court declined to find analogous liability. 187 
The second rationale the Feres Court relied on was the "distinctively 
federal" relationship between the government and service members. 188 
The FTCA provides that "the law of the place where the act or omission 
occurred" governs any consequent liability. 189 According to the Court, 
Congress could not have intended the Act to apply to service-connected 
injuries because such an interpretation would subject a service member to 
the "law of the place where the act or omission occurred." 190 Since ser-
vice members are not free to choose where they live, they have no power 
to decide the jurisdiction in which they could bring suit. 191 
members arising from non-combat activities during peacetime. See supra note 158 
and accompanying text. 
180. Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 51-52 (1949). 
181. /d. at 51-52. 
182. Peres, 340 U.S. at 141-44. 
183. /d. at 141-43. 
184. /d. at 141 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1946)). 
185. /d. 
186. /d. at 141-42. 
187. /d. at 141. Specifically, the Court refused to "visit the Government with novel and 
unprecedented liabilities." Id. at 142. But see Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 
U.S. 315, 319 (1957) (stating that "the very purpose of the [FfCA] was to ... 
establish novel and unprecedented governmental liability"). The Supreme Court 
soon realized that it had overstepped the bounds of judicial construction, and in 
later cases rejected the parallel private liability rationale as it applies to "uniquely 
governmental" functions. See Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 539 (1988) 
(putting to rest the argument that the FfCA precludes liability for uniquely govern-
mental functions); see also Note, United States v. Johnson· Expansion of the Feres 
Doctrine to Include Servicemembers' FTCA Suits Against Civilian Government Em-
ployees, 42 VAND. L. REV. 233, 240-41 (1989) [hereinafter Note, Expansion of the 
Feres Doctrine]. 
188. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 142-44 (1950). 
189. /d. at 142 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1946)). 
190. 28 u.s.c. § l346(b) (1946). 
191. Feres, 340 U.S. at 142-43. It is difficult to understand, however, how barring all 
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As its third rationale for holding the FTCA inapplicable to claims 
by service members, the Court relied on the existence of other compensa-
tion schemes for injured military veterans. 192 In enacting the FfCA, 
Congress made no substitution of remedies. The Court found the ab-
sence of such a provision persuasive that "there was no awareness that 
the [FTCA] might be interpreted to permit recovery for injuries incident 
to military service." 193 The possibility of adequate compensation under 
existing military systems, similar to workers' compensation statutes, con-
vinced the Court that allowing FfCA recovery for service members was 
not necessary. 194 
The Peres Court did not overrule its previous holding in Brooks v. 
United States; 195 instead it distinguished the two cases on their facts. 
The injury to the servicemen in Brooks occurred when they were on leave 
and not on active military duty. The Brooks Court held that the sole fact 
that the brothers were in the Army did not bar their claims, because the 
claims did not "arise out of or in the course of military duty." The Feres 
claims by service members is any more rational than allowing a claim to proceed 
under the law where the negligence occurred, as with any other FfCA claim. 
The distinctively federal argument, though not rejected outright by the Court 
in later decisions, was later described as "no longer controlling," United States v. 
Johnson, 481 U.S. 691, 695 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. 
Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 58 n.4 (1985)), and wholly abandoned in suits brought by 
federal prisoners. United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150 (1963). 
In Muniz, federal prisoners sued the government for injuries caused by the neg-
ligence of prison employees. The Court held that the FfCA did not bar the suits, 
and reasoned that while prisoners have no control over their geographical location 
and the governing local tort laws, to not allow any suits would be more prejudicial 
than a nonuniform right to recover. /d. at 162; accord United States v. Johnson, 481 
U.S. 691, 695-96 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (A "nonuniform recovery cannot possibly be 
worse than (what Feres provides) uniform nonrecovery"). But see infra notes 206-
214, 222 and accompanying text. 
192. Feres, 340 U.S. at 144-45. 
193. /d. at 144. 
194. /d. at 145. For example, the Court noted that the widow in Griggs would receive 
$22,000.00 from the government under a military compensation system, whereas 
she could only receive a maximum of $15,000.00 under Illinois' wrongful death law. 
/d. The substitute compensation rationale, like the others relied on by the Feres 
Court, has been frequently criticized. See United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 
697-99 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49 
(1949). In Brooks, the Court rejected the argument that the existence of other ser-
vice member benefits barred FfCA recovery. /d. at 53-54. Although the Brooks 
Court indicated that alternate compensation could reduce FfCA recovery, it de-
clined to rule on the exclusivity or election of remedies. /d. at 53. The Court noted 
that, unlike workers' compensation statutes, neither the FfCA nor veterans' laws 
provide for exclusiveness of remedy. The Court could find no reason to forbid 
FfCA claims for service members, veterans or their dependents in the Act or its 
legislative history. /d. But see infra notes 206-214, 222 and accompanying text. 
Subsequent to its decision in Feres, the Court in United States v. Brown, 348 
U.S. 110 (1954) reiterated that the existence of alternate compensation did not bar a 
service member's claim under the FfCA. /d. at 113. For a further discussion of the 
Brown decision, see infra notes 198-204 and accompanying text. 
195. 337 u.s. 49 (1949). 
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Court found this to be the "vital distinction."196 The servicemen in 
Brooks were able to recover because their relationship to the Army while 
on leave was not "analogous to that of a soldier injured while performing 
duties under orders."I97 
C The Military Discipline Rationale 
The most common justification offered in support of the Feres doc-
trine, the military discipline rationale-is found not in Feres itself, but in 
a later Supreme Court decision, United States v. Brown. 198 In Brown, a 
veteran alleged permanent injury to the nerves in his leg after a knee 
operation in a Veterans' Administration hospital after his discharge from 
the Army. The knee had been injured while the veteran was on active 
duty. 199 The Court concluded that Brown was governed by Brooks, and 
not by Feres, because the injury occurred after the veteran's discharge. 200 
In distinguishing Brown from Feres, the Court stated that Feres is best 
explained by the "peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his 
superiors, the effects of the maintenance of such suits on discipline, and 
the extreme results that might obtain if suits under the [FTCA] were 
allowed for negligent orders given or negligent acts committed in the 
course of military duty .... "201 
In allowing the veteran in Brown to maintain his FTCA suit, the 
Court did not back away from the Feres doctrine. Indeed, in dictum, the 
Court specifically endorsed the Feres distinction between injuries that do, 
and injuries that do not, arise out of or in the course of military duty. 202 
The Court, however, distinguished the situation in Brown from that in 
Feres by characterizing the negligent act giving rise to the veteran's in-
jury as not "incident to the military service. " 203 Thus, according to the 
court, the original knee injury suffered by the plaintiff would be barred 
196. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950). 
197. /d. 
198. 348 u.s. 110 (1954). 
199. /d. at 110-11. The veteran had received compensation under the Independent Of-
fices Appropriation Act, 38 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1935), for both the original injury and 
injuries stemming from the allegedly negligent operation after his discharge. The 
district court dismissed the veteran's FTCA claim after concluding that his sole 
relief was under the Veterans' Act. The Second Circuit reversed. Brown, 209 F.2d 
463 (2d Cir. 1954). The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the question of 
whether Brooks or Feres was controlling. United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 111 
(1954). 
200. Brown, 348 U.S. at 112. 
201. /d. (citing Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 141-43 (1950)). This rationale was 
never set forth explicitly by the Court in Feres. It was, however, explicitly adopted 
by Jefferson v. United States, 178 F.2d 518, 520 (4th Cir. 1949), aff'd sub nom. 
Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950), where the Fourth Circuit found it un-
reasonable to conclude that Congress intended that civil courts evaluate the propri-
ety of military decisions and actions, and thereby impair military discipline by 
subjecting military command to public criticism. Jefferson, 178 F.2d at 520. 
202. Brown, 348 U.S. at 113. 
203. !d. 
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under Feres while the subsequent medical malpractice injury on the same 
knee would be allowed under Brooks. 204 
D. The Supreme Court's Expansion of Peres: A Shift in Focus to the 
Military Discipline Rationale 
For almost thirty years after Brown, the Court did not rule on a 
FTCA military service claim, although it did address Feres on several 
occasions in dicta. 205 In 1977, the Court explicitly reaffirmed the under-
lying Feres doctrine in Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States,206 
a case involving a cross-claim in an indemnity action against the United 
States for injuries suffered by a National Guard officer after the ejection 
system in his fighter aircraft malfunctioned. The serviceman sued both 
the United States and the manufacturer of the ejection system. The man-
ufacturer cross-claimed against the United States, alleging that any mal-
function in the system was due to faulty government specifications and 
components. 207 
The Supreme Court held that the right of a third party to recover in 
an indemnity action against the United States, as recognized in United 
States v. Yellow Cab,208 must be limited by the rationales of the Feres 
doctrine where the injured party is a service member.209 In reaching its 
204. /d. Justice Black, in dissent, called for the application of a "but for" test. Accord-
ing to Justice Black; the injury in the present case was inseparably related to mili-
tary service because the veteran could not have been injured in the Veterans' 
Administration hospital "but for" his Army service and related injury. Thus, Feres, 
and not Brooks, should be controlling. In particular, Justice Black thought that 
veterans and soldiers should receive the same disability benefits for a hospital injury. 
Therefore, he concluded, "We have previously held, I think correctly, that a soldier 
injured in a hospital cannot also sue for damages under the [FfCA]. But the Court 
now holds that a veteran can." /d. at 114 (Black, J., dissenting) (citing Peres v. 
United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950)). 
205. See Matinez v. Shrock, 430 U.S. 920, 920-21 (1977) (White, J., dissenting from de-
nial of certiorari); United States v. Demko, 385 U.S. 149, 152-53 (1966); Richards v. 
United States, 369 U.S. 1, 6-10 (1962). 
206. 431 u.s. 666 (1977). 
207. !d. at 668. The district court had dismissed the claim, holding that Feres barred the 
claim of the serviceman and that of the manufacturer. Donham v. United States, 
395 F. Supp. 52 (E.D. Mo. 1975). The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Donham v. United 
States, 536 F.2d 765 (8th Cir. 1976). The Supreme Court granted certiorari to re-
solve the tension between the Feres doctrine and the indemnity principles of United 
States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543 (1951). See Stencel, 431 U.S. at 670. 
In Yellow Cab, the Court held that the FTCA permits third-party impleader 
against the government, under a theory of indemnity or contribution, if the original 
defendant claims that the United States was wholly or partially responsible for the 
plaintiff's injury. Yellow Cab, 340 U.S. at 553. Thus, in Stencel, the Court was 
faced with a conflict between well-established indemnity principles under the FfCA 
and the equally well-established Feres doctrine. The specific issue addressed by the 
Stencel Court was whether a private defendant could seek indemnification from the 
United States under the FTCA when a service member has brought a tort action 
against that defendant. Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 
670 (1977). 
208. 340 U.S. 543 (1951); see also supra note 207. 
209. Stencel, 431 U.S. at 6.73-74. 
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decision, the Court applied two of the rationales it enunciated in Feres 
and the military discipline rationale first enunciated in Brown.210 First, 
the Court noted that the distinctively federal relationship between the 
government and members of the armed forces applies equally to the rela-
tionship between the government and its military suppliers and contrac-
tors. 211 Second, while the Court acknowledged that the military 
compensation scheme, which prevents service members from recovery 
under the FTCA, provides no relief to a third party, the Court nonethe-
less held that where the Veterans' Benefits Act212 provides an upper limit 
of liability for service-connected injuries, the FTCA cannot be used to 
circumvent that limitation by indemnity claims.213 Finally, the Court 
concluded that "where the case concerns an injury sustained by a soldier 
while on duty, the effect of the action upon military discipline is identical 
whether the suit is brought by the soldier directly or by a third party."214 
With the Court's decision in Stencel, the military discipline rationale 
became a dominant theme in cases decided by the Burger Court. Chief 
Justice Burger, writing for the majority in Chappell v. Wallace, 215 further 
expanded the scope of the Fe res doctrine by holding that enlisted military 
personnel may not recover damages from a superior officer for alleged 
constitutional violations because of the need for special regulations in 
relation to military discipline.216 The Court's analysis focused on "the 
peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors," and the 
unique structure of the military establishment.217 Noting that "no mili-
tary organization can function without strict discipline and regulation 
that would be unacceptable in a civilian setting," the Court cautioned 
that "[c]ivilian courts must, at the very least, hesitate long before enter-
taining a suit which asks the Court to tamper with the established rela-
tionship between enlisted military personnel and their superior 
officers."218 Relying on Feres and a longstanding history of deferring to 
Congress' authority over military affairs, the Court declined to extend its 
prior decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the -Federal 
Bureau of Narcotics 219 to claims by enlisted military personnel because of 
the intrusion upon military discipline and authority such claims might 
210. See supra notes 188-194, 201 and accompanying text. 
21 I. Stencel, 431 U.S. at 672. 
212. Public L. No. 85-857, § 1, 72 Stat. 1105 (codified as amended at 38 U.S.C. §§ 1-1-
5228 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)). 
213. Stencel, 431 U.S. at 673. 
214. !d. 
215. 462 u.s. 296 (1983). 
216. /d. at 305. 
217. /d. at 300. 
218. /d. 
219. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). In Bivens, the Court had authorized suits for damages against 
federal officials whose actions violated an individual's constitutional rights, even 
where Congress had not expressly authorized such suits. /d. at 397; see also supra 
note 11, and infra note 245. • 
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have.220 
The military discipline rationale, which was not one of the three 
rationales the Court relied on in Feres, 221 has been repeatedly and almost 
mindlessly applied to bar service member claims under the FTCA, even 
as the original Feres rationales have been rejected by both the Supreme 
Court and lower courts.222 The shift in focus to the military discipline 
rationale has resulted in a mechanistic rejection of service members' 
FTCA claims on the ground that military discipline might be impaired if 
the claims were allowed to go forward. The prospect of service members 
"second-guessing" military orders, and the possibility of military person-
nel testifying in court as to each other's decisions and actions,223 has led 
courts to dismiss claims even where there is no logical or rational connec-
tion between military discipline and the alleged injury.224 
220. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 300-05. According to Chief Justice Burger: 
The special status of the military has required, the Constitution has con-
templated, Congress has created, and this Court has long recognized two 
systems of justice, to some extent parallel: one for civilians and one for 
military personnel. The special nature of military life-the need for un-
hesitating and decisive action by military officers and equally disciplined 
responses by enlisted personnel-would be undermined by a judicially cre-
ated remedy exposing officers to personal liability at the hands of those 
they are charged to command. 
/d. at 303-04 (citation omitted). 
221. For a discussion of the three original Fe res rationales, see supra notes 182-194 and 
accompanying text.' See also Note, Rethinking "Incident to Service" Analysis, supra 
note 159, at 181-82 (1988). 
222. See supra notes 191-194 and accompanying text. The parallel private liability ra-
tionale was rejected by the Supreme Court in both Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 
352 U.S. 315, 319 (1957) and Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 66-
69 (1955). The distinctively federal rationale was rejected by the Court in United 
States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 161 (1963). The third Feres rationale, the uniform 
compensation rationale, had been largely ignored by both the Supreme Court and 
lower courts since the Brown decision, where a serviceman was permitted to recover 
under the FTCA even though veterans' benefits were available to him. United 
States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 113 (1959); see also Note, Expansion of the Feres 
Doctrine, supra note 187, at 242. 
Although the Supreme Court seemed to have abandoned those rationales after 
Feres was decided, the Court resurrected the distinctively federal rationale and the 
uniform compensation rationale in Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 
U.S. 666, 671 (1977). According to one commentator, many lower courts and com-
mentators "questioned the continued viability of Feres when military discipline was 
not at stake" before Stencel was decided. See Note, Expansion of the Feres Doctrine, 
supra note 187, at 243. Afterward, lowe:- courts again gave weight to the original 
Feres rationales and summarily denied recovery to servicemen. /d. 
223. Stencel, 431 U.S. at 673. 
224. This is particularly true of military medical malpractice cases, in which military 
discipline is not a compelling issue. See, e.g., Major v. United States, 835 F.2d 641, 
644-45 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2871 (1988) ("In recent years the 
[Supreme] Court has embarked on a course dedicated to broadening the Feres doc-
trine to encompass, at a minimum, all injuries suffered by military personnel that 
are even remotely related to the individual's status as a member of the military, 
without regard to ... any nexus between the injury-producing event and the essen-
tial defense/combat purpose of the military activity from which it arose.") (empha-
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E. Recent Expansion of the Peres Doctrine: A Return to "Incident to 
Service" Analysis 
The Feres doctrine, in its broadest form, would appear to preclude 
all tort claims by service members against the federal government. In its 
most narrow form, the rule would seem to preclude only those claims by 
active duty service members which genuinely implicate military disci-
pline. Since 1950, the Supreme Court and lower federal courts have 
struggled, without much success, to more precisely define the limits of 
the doctrine. 
In United States v. Shearer, 225 the Court considered a wrongful 
death claim brought by the mother of an army private who was mur-
dered by a fellow service member while off-base and off duty. The Third 
Circuit ruled that Fe res did not bar recovery because the decedent, unlike 
the claimants in Feres, was on leave at the time of his death. 226 In revers-
ing the Third Circuit, the Supreme Court proclaimed that the Feres doc-
trine "cannot be reduced to a few bright-line rules," and that each case 
must be decided individually.227 Despite the fact that the decedent was 
off-duty and off-base at the time of his murder, the Court held that the 
claim was barred because the suit required a "civilian court to second-
guess military decisions, " 228 and called "into question basic choices 
sis in original). For additional examples, see Schwartz, A Proposed Reform of the 
Feres Doctrine, supra note 159, at 1003-10. 
225. 473 u.s. 52 (1985). 
226. Shearer v. United States, 723 F.2d 1102 (3d Cir. 1983). The District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania had dismissed the claim under the Feres doctrine. 
Shearer, 576 F. Supp. 672 (E.D. Pa. 1982). 
227. 473 u.s. 52, 57 (1985). 
228. /d. The Court reasoned that the possibility of impaired military discipline and effec-
tiveness outweighed the fact that the murder had taken place while the soldier was 
off-duty and off-base. /d. 
In the confusion following Brooks, Feres, and Brown, lower courts unnecessa-
rily expanded the Feres doctrine by relying on overly-restrictive tests such as off-
base/on-base or off-duty/on-duty distinctions. Compare Preferred Ins. Co. v. 
United States, 222 F.2d 942, 948 (9th Cir.) (recovery denied for injuries sustained 
when plane fell on serviceman's home located on-base), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 837 
(1955) with Sapp v. United States, 153 F. Supp. 496, 498 (W.D. La. 1957) (recovery 
permitted for injuries sustained when plane fell on serviceman's off-base home); see 
also Hass v. United States, 518 F.2d 1138, 1140 (4th Cir. 1975) (recovery denied to 
off-duty serviceman injured while riding a horse rented from Marine Corps stable); 
Chambers v. United States, 357 F.2d 224, 229 (8th Cir. 1966) (recovery denied 
where serviceman drowned while swimming recreationally in base pool). 
In Miller v. United States, 643 F.2d 481 (8th Cir. 1980), the Eighth Circuit 
surveyed other Circuit decisions and found that courts barred service members' 
claims if, at the time of injury, the service member was on a military base, on active 
duty status, under compulsion of military orders or engaged in an activity that is a 
privilege related to or dependent upon military status. /d. at 483. Under such a 
restrictive analysis, the presence of any one of the four factors barred recovery. The 
only factual scenarios permitting recovery would be for an injury off-duty and off-
base, the situation in Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49 (1949), but rejected in 
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about the discipline, supervision, and control of a serviceman."229 
Shearer contains conflicting messages for those anxious to see a re-
laxation of the Feres doctrine. The optimists among us take comfort in 
the Court's statement that there are no hard and fast rules to ascertain 
the reach of Feres and that a case-by-case analysis is necessary. This 
language leaves room for the argument that Feres should be applied only 
where issues of military command are implicated. 23° For the pessimists, 
however, Shearer represents an expansion of the Feres doctrine, preclud-
ing not only claims like those brought in Feres (claims for injuries sus-
tained by active duty personnel), but also precluding claims for injuries 
sustained by service members on leave or after discharge, a class of 
claims not addressed by Feres, and specifically allowed in Brooks and 
Brown. 231 
In 1987, the Supreme Court confronted the Feres doctrine on two 
occasions.232 Significantly, both cases were decided by a five-four major-
ity. In the first case, United States v. Johnson, 233 the widow of a Coast 
Guard helicopter pilot alleged negligence on the part of civilian employ-
ees of the Federal Aviation Administration in providing radar control to 
the pilot during a rescue mission. The Eleventh Circuit ruled that Feres 
Shearer v. United States, 473 U.S. 52 (1985), or for injury after discharge, the situa-
tion in United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110 (1954). 
Other courts have applied the even more restrictive "but-for" test to deny re-
covery: if an injury would not have occurred but-for the plaintiff's status as a ser-
vice member, the claim is barred. See, e.g., Schwager v. United States, 326 F. Supp. 
1081, 1086 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (government not liable under FfCA for injuries arising 
out of conduct incident to military service even when illness first manifested at 
home while on leave). The Supreme Court explicitly rejected a strict but-for test in 
Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 51 (1949). But see Justice Black's dissent in 
United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 114 (Black, J., dissenting). 
229. Shearer, 473 U.S. at 58. Although the complaint alleged negligence by the Army in 
making a "straightforward personnel decision," the Court refused to let the soldier's 
widow "escape the Feres net" by recharacterizing what the Court termed a manage-
ment "decision of command." /d. at 59. 
The Court acknowledged that the soldier who was convicted of Shearer's mur-
der had previously been convicted of manslaughter while at an Army base in Ger-
many before being transferred to Fort Bliss. Nonetheless, the Court dismissed the 
claim, which alleged that the Army negligently failed to control and warn others of 
a soldier it knew to be dangerous, because it feared that allowing such suits would 
expose commanding officers to civilian review of military and disciplinary decisions. 
/d. at 58. 
230. See Atkinson v. United States, 804 F.2d 561, 563 (9th Cir. 1986) (recovery allowed 
for medical malpractice claim which did not affect military discipline and therefore 
was not incident to service), withdrawn, 825 F.2d 202 (9th Cir. 1987) (reinstatement 
of per se denial of recovery to serviceman for military medical malpractice following 
Supreme Court decision in United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681 (1987)). 
231. But cf Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49 (1949) (off-duty serviceman hit by 
military vehicle not barred by Feres doctrine from recovery under FfCA); Brown v. 
United States, 348 U.S. 110 (1954) (veteran allowed to recover for military medical 
malpractice which took place after discharge). 
232. United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681 (1987); United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 
669 (1987). 
233. 481 u.s. 681 (1987). 
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was inapplicable because the suit alleged negligence on the part of civil-
ian government employees and not on the part of miliary personnel, and 
thus did not implicate issues of military discipline or the like.234 
The Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice Powell, re-
versed the Eleventh Circuit, holding that the pilot's death arose out of an 
activity directly related to his military service and, therefore, the claim 
was barred by the Feres doctrine. 235 As a rationale, Justice Powell of-
fered only that a claim arising out of "service-related activity necessarily 
implicates the military judgments and decisions that are inextricably in-
tertwined with the conduct of the military mission,"236 even where the 
military judgments and decisions do not form the basis for the claim. 
Widening further the military discipline rationale, Justice Powell as-
serted that "military discipline involves not only obedience to orders, but 
more generally duty and loyalty to one's service and to one's country."237 
In Johnson, the Court broadened the military discipline rationale 
and shifted the focus back to the original Feres emphasis on whether a 
service member's claim is "incident to service." Once again, however, 
the Court did not adequately define that phrase. Moreover, the Court's 
resurrection of the original Feres rationales,238 although not explicitly 
overruling the Shearer military discipline analysis, undoubtedly will lead 
to confusion among lower courts. 239 
Justice Scalia, joined by three other justices in dissent, railed bitterly 
against the injustice of Feres and indicated that he would be willing to 
overrule the doctrine outright in the proper case.240 He further advo-
cated a rule that would confine Feres to FTCA suits alleging military 
negligence. 241 
Johnson, like Shearer, contains two conflicting messages regarding 
the scope and continued vitality of the Feres doctrine. On the one hand, 
the opinion suggests that claims by service members will be barred even 
where such claims have a tenuous impact upon the so-called "military 
234. Johnson v. United States, 749 F.2d 1530, 1539 (11th Cir. 1985), a.ff'd on rehearing, 
779 F.2d 1492 (lith Cir. 1986). 
235. Johnson, 481 U.S. at 691-92. In "declin[ing] to modify the [Feres] doctrine at this 
late date," Justice Powell relied on the fact that the Court had never "deviated" 
from the doctrine, and that Congress, despite the fact that it could have remedied 
the Feres doctrine if the Court had misinterpreted its intent by focusing on whether 
service members' injuries are "incident to service," had not "changed this standard 
in the close to 40 years since it was articulated." /d. at 686-88. 
236. /d. at 691. 
237. /d. 
238. See supra notes 182-194 and accompanying text. 
239. See supra note 228 and accompanying text. 
240. United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 703 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by 
Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ.). Justice Scalia forcefully observed that "Feres 
was wrongly decided and heartily deserves the 'widespread, almost universal criti-
cism' it has received." /d. at 700 (quoting In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 
580 F. Supp. 1242, 1246 (E.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 745 F.2d 161 (2d Cir. 1984)). 
241. /d. 
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mission. " 242 On the other hand, the doctrine's longevity may be in ques-
tion, given the length and fervor of Justice Scalia's dissent, that three 
other Justices shared his position, and that now-retired Justice Powell 
authored the Court's majority opinion. 
In the second 1987 case, United States v. Stanley,243 the Supreme 
Court again affirmed and expanded the Feres doctrine. Stanley involved a 
FTCA claim by a former serviceman against the government for injuries 
sustained as a consequence of being given a hallucinogenic drug in a gov-
ernment study without his knowledge or consent.244 The Court's opin-
ion, authored by Justice Scalia, rejected the plaintiff's claim on the 
authority of Feres, because the claimant's injuries arose out of an activity 
directly related to his military service.245 
Significantly, however, Justice O'Connor, who was a member of the 
majority in Johnson, wrote a dissenting opinion in Stanley in which she 
stated that the government's conduct was "so far beyond the bounds of 
human decency that as a matter of law it simply cannot be considered a 
part of the military mission."246 As indicated from her dissent, Justice 
O'Connor appears willing to recognize that there are some injuries sus-
242. See, e.g., Appelhans v. United States, 877 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1989). In Appelhans, 
an Army service member on indefinite excess leave pending review of his court-
martial sentence was later formally discharged. After his discharge, he filed a medi-
cal malpractice claim against the government, alleging negligent failure to diagnose 
and treat a medical condition for which he had sought treatment at an Army hospi-
tal while on excess leave. The District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia 
dismissed his claim on the ground that it was barred by Peres and its progeny. /d. at 
310. 
The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that medical treatment at a military hos-
pital is "incident to service" and malpractice claims are thus barred by the Peres 
doctrine. /d. at 313. While the court acknowledged that "the Peres doctrine is not 
without critics," and may produce "undeniably harsh results," it felt bound by the 
Johnson Court's revitalization of the military discipline rationale and the original 
Peres rationales. /d. at 313. Thus, the court rejected Appelhans' contention that his 
relationship to the Army's "military mission" while on excess leave was too remote 
and tenuous to fall under the general principles of Peres and Johnson. /d. at 312-13. 
243. 483 u.s. 669 (1987). 
244. The drug had been given to the claimant in connection with a 1958 study performed 
at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds in Maryland. The sole purpose of the study was 
to ascertain the effect of the drug on humans. Thus, the claimant was literally used 
as a human guinea pig in the government study. He did not learn of the drug ad-
ministration until 17 years later, when he received a letter soliciting his cooperation 
in a study on the long-term effects of LSD. At that point, he filed his claims against 
the government. /d. at 671-72. 
245. The claimant filed claims against the government under the FTCA and on the Biv-
ens theory. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 
403 U.S. 388 (1971) recognized a cause of action for violation of constitutional 
rights against federal officials even in the absence of a statute authorizing such relief. 
The FTCA claim was dismissed and never was considered by the Supreme Court on 
its merits. The Court, however, held that the exception to the FTCA established by 
Peres is as extensive as the abstention required by federal courts in the face of a 
Bivens claim. Thus, Peres and its progeny are directly controlling in the Bivens 
context. United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 680-81 (1987). 
246. Stanley, 483 U.S. at 709 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
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tained by active duty military personnel at the hands of other govern-
ment employees which neither "arise out of," nor are "incident to," 
military service. 
In light of these recent decisions, one can envision a coalition com-
posed of Justice Scalia, Justice O'Connor, and the three Justices who dis-
sented in both Johnson and Stanley-Justices Brennan, Marshall, and 
Stevens-willing to restrict the Feres doctrine in the appropriate case. 
Thus, serious consideration should be given to pressing meritorious 
claims on behalf of injured service members, even where such claims, at 
first blush, appear barred by the Feres doctrine. 
F. Conclusion 
The FTCA was enacted in 1946, shortly after the end of the World 
War II. Although Congress waived sovereign immunity for many tort 
claims previously barred, it chose to retain immunity for claims arising 
out of military combat activities during times of war. Given the fact that 
nearly one million American military personnel were killed or wounded 
during World War 11,247 the explicit exception for injuries arising from 
combat activities is understandable. The Supreme Court's expansion of 
that exception under the Feres doctrine, however, is neither understanda-
ble nor appropriate. 
The Supreme Court's recent expansion of the Feres doctrine in John-
son and Stanley now appears to afford the government absolute immu-
nity from suits by service members. 248 This apparent grant of absolute 
immunity contradicts the basic intent and policies underlying the con-
gressional waiver of sovereign immunity under the FTCA. The Court's 
expansion of Section 26800) of the FTCA-the combatant exception-to 
any claim brought by a service member is outside the scope of Congress' 
initial intent. Indeed, criticism of the Fe res doctrine in its current form is 
nearly universal.249 Lower court dissatisfaction with both Feres and its 
successors will lead to an ever-conflicting array of cases. Thus, to reduce 
confusion and to uphold the original intent of Congress, the Supreme 
Court should severely restrict Feres, or overrule the Feres doctrine 
entirely. 
V. CLAIMS ARISING OUT OF THE EXERCISE OF A 
DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION 
When Congress waived federal sovereign immunity from suits for 
injuries caused by the negligence of government agents, officials or em-
ployees, it explicitly reserved immunity for certain claims. One such res-
247. Between 1939 and 1945, 292,131 service members were killed and 671,278 military 
personnel were wounded. R. GORALSKI, WORLD WAR II ALMANAC: 1931-1945 
428 (1984 ed.). 
248. See supra notes 232-246 and accompanying text. 
249. See supra note 240. 
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ervation, considered by many to be the most important,250 is the 
discretionary function exception. 251 The rule that immunity is retained 
for claims arising out of the performance of a discretionary function is 
easily stated but difficult to apply. The Supreme Court has not set clear 
standards for differentiating between immune "discretionary" acts and 
acts which involve the exercise of discretion but are not immune.252 In-
deed, the Court has observed that it is virtually "impossible to define 
with precision every contour of the discretionary function exception."253 
Consequently, the various circuits have taken conflicting approaches in 
resolving discretionary function claims. 254 Thus, whether a government 
employee's act or omission involves the exercise of discretion depends 
more upon the jurisdiction in which a suit is filed than upon the facts of 
the particular case. 
A. The Lack of a Definition of "Discretionary Function" under 
Dalehite v. United States 
In its first consideration of the discretionary function exception, the 
Supreme Court in Dalehite v. United 'States 255 found it unnecessary to 
define precisely the parameters of governmental activity characterized as 
"discretionary."256 Instead, the Court focused on whether the acts of the 
250. See H.R. REP. No. 2245, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 10 (1942) (calling the discretionary 
function exception a "highly important exception"); see also Schwartz & Mah-
shigian, In the 1990's the Government Must Be a Reasonable Person in Its Work-
places: The Discretionary Function Immunity Shield Must Be Trimmed, 46 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 359, 360 (1989) (calling the discretionary function exception "the 
most important of the exclusions [and] also the most amorphous"). 
251. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1982). Section 2680(a) provides that sovereign immunity is 
not waived for 
/d. 
[a]ny claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Govern-
ment, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, 
whether or not such statute or regulation·be valid, or based upon the exer-
cise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary 
function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the 
Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused. 
252. See, e.g., Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953), where the Court first dis-
cussed the discretionary function exception, but failed to set forth a definitive test 
for application of the exception. 
253. United States v. S.A. Empresa De Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 
467 u.s. 797, 813 (1984). 
254. Compare Allen v. United States, 816 F.2d 1417, 1424 (lOth Cir. 1987) (dismissing 
claims brought by residents of Utah for injuries arising out of government's failure 
to monitor and provide public information on radioactive fallouts during nuclear 
testing in the 1950s and 1960s, because the government's planning and implement-
ing activities involved policy judgment), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988) with 
Starrett v. United States, 847 F.2d 539, 542 (9th Cir. 1988) (allowing claim alleging 
well water contamination by chemicals from an adjoining naval base because the 
failure to follow legislative and presidential guidelines for "secondary treatment" of 
waste waters from federal facilities is not a discretionary act). 
255. 346 u.s. 15 (1953). 
256. /d. at 35. 
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federal officials and employees involved "policy judgment and decision," 
and whether those decisions were made at a planning or operational 
level.257 
Dalehite was a test case representing over 300 separate claims total-
ling more than 200 million dollars. The claims arose from an explosion 
and fire that destroyed Texas City, Texas. Although the cause of the fire 
was unknown, the source of the explosions and fire was a highly flamma-
ble government-manufactured fertilizer. The fertilizer was produced, 
distributed, and was about to be shipped, by the government as part of a 
foreign aid program after World War 11.258 After manufacturing and 
packaging the fertilizer, the government shipped the fertilizer to Texas 
City, where it was loaded onto French steamships heading for Europe. 
Although the fertilizer contained an ingredient used for explosives and 
was known by the government to be dangerous, the fertilizer was coated 
in a flammable substance, placed in easily ignitable paper bags, and inad-
equately labeled as flammable. The fertilizer was loaded next to a cargo 
of explosives; the fertilizer ignited and caused the cargo to explode. 259 
Plaintiffs injured by the explosion sued the United States govern-
ment for negligently manufacturing and distributing a highly flammable 
material without adequate warning. 260 The Court held that the discre-
tionary function exception barred every claim of negligent action or deci-
sion making by the government in creating or implementing the fertilizer 
program.261 In reaching its decision, the Court began by examining the 
legislative history and basic jurisprudential principles behind the FTCA 
and its waiver of sovereign immunity.262 
The Court acknowledged that the motivation and legislative pur-
pose in enacting the FTCA was to allow suits against the government 
previously barred by sovereign immunity for negligent acts or omissions 
of government agents or employees.263 The Court noted, however, that 
while it was bound to give the Act a construction consistent with that 
purpose, it was also obligated to give "due regard for the statutory excep-
tions to that policy."264 According to the Court, the discretionary func-
257. !d. at 35-36. 
258. !d. at 19. The foreign aid plan was the government's solution to the problem of 
feeding the people of Germany, Japan, and Korea during post-war United States 
occupation. The plan had been ordered by the Office of War Mobilization andRe-
conversion, approved by the Cabinet, provided with funds by the War Department, 
and administered by the Field Director of Ammunition Plants. /d. at 20. 
259. !d. at 17-23. 
260. Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 23. The district court accepted the plaintiffs' theory, after 
finding that a number of negligent acts by the government proximately caused their 
injuries. The Fifth Circuit reversed and rendered judgment for the United States. 
In re Texas City Disaster Litig., 197 F.2d 771 (5th Cir. 1952). The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari because the case "presented an important problem of federal stat-
utory interpretation." Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 17. 
261. !d. at 42. 
262. /d. at 24-30. 
263. /d. at 31. 
264. !d. 
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tion exception was enacted to protect governmental decision making and 
policy judgments from "second guessing" by the courts. 265 In the 
Court's view, Congress agreed to waive government immunity for such 
acts as the negligent operation of a vehicle, but did not consent to suit for 
governmental activities involving some measure of discretion or judg-
ment, such as that involved in the fertilizer program.266 
Again, the Court found it "unnecessary to define ... precisely where 
discretion ends. " 267 Rather, the Court found it sufficient to hold that 
the "discretionary function or duty" that cannot form a basis 
for suit under the Tort Claims Act includes more than the initi-
ation of programs and activities. It also includes determina-
tions made by executives or administrators in establishing 
plans, specifications or schedules of operations. Where there is 
room for policy judgment and decision there is discretion. It 
necessarily follows that acts of subordinates in carrying out the 
operations of government in accordance with official direction 
cannot be actionable. If it were not so, the protection of 
2680(a) would fail at the time it would be needed, that is, when 
a subordinate performs or fails to perform a causal step, each 
action or nonaction being directed by the superior exercising, 
perhaps abusing, discretion. 268 
In the years following the Court's broad and sweeping proclamation 
that "[ w ]here there is room for policy judgment and decision there is 
discretion," lower courts were faced with the dilemma of either barring 
every claim involving some element of choice by a government employee, 
or manipulating the Dalehite planning/operational distinction to hold 
that some claims were not barred. 269 
265. /d. at 28-30. In support of its interpretation, the Court referred to an oft-quoted 
paragraph of the House Report of the 77th Congress that adopted the discretionary 
function exception. The paragraph provides that the discretionary function 
exception 
is a highly important exception, intended to preclude any possibility that 
the bill might be construed to authorize suit for damages against the Gov-
ernment growing out of an authorized activity ... where no negligence on 
the part of any Government agent is shown, and the only ground for suit is 
the contention that the same conduct by a private individual would be 
tortious, or that the statute or regulation authorizing the project was inva-
lid .... The bill is not intended to authorize a suit for damages to test the 
validity of or provide a remedy on account of such discretionary acts even 
though negligently performed and involving an abuse of discretion. 
/d. at 29 n.21 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 2245, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 10 (1942)). 
266. /d. at 34. 
267. /d. at 35. 
268. /d. at 35-36 (emphasis supplied) (footnote omitted). 
269. See, e.g., Jablonski v. United States, 712 F.2d 391, 396 (9th Cir. 1983) (failure of 
government psychiatrist to warn foreseeable victim of violent tendencies of mental 
patients is operational act, not discretionary act involving planning); Nevin v. 
United States, 696 F.2d 1229, 1230-31 (9th Cir.) (decision by chief chemical officer 
authorizing biological warfare vulnerability test was made at planning level and, 
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B. The "Planning/Operational" Distinction 
The test enunciated by the majority in Dalehite to determine 
whether a governmental act or omission falls within the discretionary 
function exception focused on whether the decisions were made at a 
planning or operational level. Obviously, all acts involve some elements 
of choice or decision. For example, in deciding to meet its obligations 
during the occupation of Europe by shipping fertilizer, the government 
made decisions ranging from converting artillery plants to fertilizer 
plants, to deciding whether paper is a suitable material for bagging hot 
fertilizer, to how the bags should be labelled. According to the Court, all 
of the allegedly negligent acts took place at the planning level, and thus 
were protected by the discretionary function exception. 270 
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Jackson criticized the majority's fo-
cus on who exercised the discretion and whether an act is discretion-
ary.271 In Justice Jackson's view, "[t]he statute itself contains not the 
vaguest intimation of such a test which leaves actionable only the mis-
conduct of file clerks and truck drivers."272 The key issue is not whether 
the person making a decision is at a "high-altitude," but whether the act 
involved is an exertion of governmental authority, or balancing of "care 
against cost, of safety against production, of warning· against silence. " 273 
The dissent found that the government's negligence in manufactur-
ing and shipping the fertilizer did not involve "policy decisions of a regu-
latory or governmental nature, but involved actions akin to those of a 
private manufacturer, contractor, or shipper."274 Justice Jackson there-
fore reasoned that, where government officials performed activities of a 
"housekeeping" nature, there is "no good reason to stretch the legislative 
text to immunize the government or its officers from responsibility for 
their acts .... " 275 
C Between Dalehite and Varig 
For the next thirty years, the debate between the majority and dis-
senting opinions in Dalehite was reflected in lower court decisions. Some 
courts, struggling with the planning/operational distinction, found solace 
in the decisions of the Supreme Court in Indian Towing Co. v. United 
therefore, decision to use strain of bacterium resulting in the death of plaintiff was 
discretionary function), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 815 (1983); Doyle v. United States, 
530 F.Supp. 1278, 1283-84 (C.D. Ca. 1982) (discretionary function exception insu-
lates any high level policy judgments from FICA liability, but where decision oc-
curs at operational level of government, exception provides no protection although 
discretion and judgment may in fact have been exercised). 
270. Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 42. 
271. /d. at 58 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
272. /d. n.l2. 
273. /d. at 57-58. 
274. /d. at 60. 
275. /d. 
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States,216 and Rayonier, Inc. v. United States.2'1 In Indian Towing, a tug-
boat ran aground when a Coast Guard operated lighthouse failed to 
function, causing damage to the cargo on the barge it was towing. The 
tugboat's owners sued the government for failing to check and repair the 
light or give warning that the light was not operating.278 In Rayonier, a 
forest fire which started on government land and spread to adjacent pri-
vate property destroyed timber and buildings belonging to the plaintiffs. 
The property owners sued the government for the negligence of the 
United States Forest Services in failing to properly fight the forest fire 
and in allowing flammable materials to accumulate on government 
land.279 
In both Indian Towing and Rayonier the government did not assert 
that the discretionary function exception barred the claims; rather, the 
government argued that it was not liable for negligence arising from 
"uniquely governmental functions." 280'fhus, the Court was not presented 
with the opportunity to reconsider the interpretation of the discretionary 
function exception set out in Dalehite. Dicta in both cases, however, in-
dicates a limitation on the Dalehite decision. In Indian Towing, the 
Court, after finding Dalehite inapplicable, observed that the "broad and 
just purpose which the [FTCA] was designed to effect was to compensate 
the victims of negligence in the conduct of governmental activities in cir-
cumstances like . . . those in which a private person would be lia-
ble .... " 281 The Rayonier Court acknowledged the heavy burden that 
may be imposed upon the public treasury if the government is held re-
sponsible for the negligence of it's employees and agencies. The Court, 
however, rejected consideration of such a factor in the face of obvious 
congressional intent in passing the FTCA.282 Moreover, the Court sug-
gested that, "[t]o the extent that there was anything to the contrary in 
the Dalehite case it was necessarily rejected by Indian Towing."283 Fi-
nally, the Court cautioned that "[t]here is no justification for this Court 
to read exemptions into the [FTCA] beyond those provided by Congress. 
If the Act is to be altered that is a function for the same body that 
adopted it."284 Those broad policy pronouncements, however, did not 
end the debate over the scope of the discretionary functions exception. 
D. Varig and the Return of Dalehite 
Following the Supreme Court's decisions in Indian Towing and 
276. 350 u.s. 61 (1955). 
277. 352 U.S. 315 (1957). 
278. Indian Towing, 350 U.S. at 62. 
279. Rayonier, 352 U.S. at 315-16. 
280. Rayonier, 352 U.S. at 319; Indian Towing, 350 U.S. at 64. 
281. Indian Towing, 350 U.S. at 68. 
282. Rayonier, 352 U.S. at 319-20. The Court noted that Congress, after long considera-
tion, had seen fit to impose such liability on the United States. /d. 
283. /d. at 319 (footnote omitted). 
284. /d. at 320 (footnote omitted). 
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Rayonier, the validity of Dalehite was questioned by courts and commen-
tators. 285 Believing the Dalehite Court had overbroadly interpreted the 
discretionary function exception, courts sought to narrow its applica-
tion.286 In 1984, however, the Court reaffirmed Dalehite in no uncertain 
terms in United States v. S.A. Empresa De Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense 
(Varig Airlines). 287 Responding to the claim that cases such as Indian 
Towing had "eroded, if not overruled" Dalehite, the Court flatly rejected 
the "supposition that Dalehite no longer represents a valid interpretation 
of the discretionary function exception. " 288 
In Varig, the Court reviewed two cases involving negligence by the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in certifying commercial air-
craft. In both cases, aircraft certified by the FAA as airworthy caught 
fire mid-air when non-regulation equipment failed to operate or was 
missing. The FAA had not inspected the aircraft itself; instead, the FAA 
had delegated inspection responsibility to aircraft manufacturers and im-
plemented a "spot-check" program to ensure manufacturer compliance 
with FAA safety regulations. The plaintiffs alleged that the FAA was 
negligent in delegating inspection responsibilities, implementing the spot-
check program, and issuing airworthiness certificates to the two aircraft 
even though they had not met existing fire protection standards. 289 
The Court held that the discretionary function exception immunized 
the FAA from tort liability for all three negligent acts.290 The Court 
held that the exception protected both the FAA officials who designed 
the system of compliance review and the employees who carried out the 
"spot-check" program in accordance with agency directives.291 The 
Court reasoned that the FAA is a government regulatory agency which 
merely polices aircraft manufacturers by monitoring their compliance 
with FAA regulations. The Court noted that the development, imple-
mentation, and execution of a "spot-check" program is exactly the sort 
of discretionary governmental function Section 2680(a) was designed to 
protect from judicial "second-guessing,"292 and without such protection, 
285. See, e.g., Lindgren v. United States, 665 F.2d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 1982) ("Although 
Dalehite remains an important statement of the policy behind the discretionary 
function exemption, subsequent decisions by the Supreme Court and various circuit 
courts have operated to narrow Dalehite's definition of the term 'discretion.'"); see 
also Fishback & Killefer, The Discretionary Function Exception to the Federal Tort 
Claims Act: Dalehite to Varig to Berkovitz, 25 IDAHO L. REV. 291, 296-97 (1988-
89) [hereinafter Fishback & Killefer, Discretionary Function]. 
286. Downs v. United States, 522 F.2d 990, 995-98 (6th Cir. 1975) (mere exercise of 
judgment does not insulate government from liability for its employees' torts; only 
those activities which entail formulation of governmental policy are protected); see 
also Fishback & Killefer, Discretionary Function, supra note 285, at 296. 
287. 467 u.s. 797 (1984). 
288. /d. at 811-12. 
289. /d. at 801-03. 
290. /d. at 815-16. 
291. /d. at 819-20. 
292. /d. at 814-15. 
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efficient government operations would be seriously hampered. 293 
The Court pointed to the legislative history of Section 2680(a) in 
support of its decision. Like the Dalehite Court, the Varig Court found 
persuasive the House Report which stated that "claims against Federal 
agencies growing out of their regulatory activities" are clearly exempted 
from the waiver of sovereign immunity.294 Additionally, the Court rea-
soned that protecting regulatory activities from suit upholds Congress' 
underlying purpose in enacting the discretionary function exception. 
"Congress wished to prevent judicial 'second-guessing' of legislative and 
administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and political pol-
icy through the medium of an action in tort. " 295 Thus, while the Court 
acknowledged that its interpretation of the FTCA and the discretionary 
function exception had not "followed a straight line," the Court chose to 
reaffirm its prior interpretation of Section 2680(a) in Dalehite.296 
As in Dalehite, the Varig Court stressed the importance of the dis-
cretionary function exception in marking the boundary between Con-
gress' desire to waive immunity when governmental wrongs cause injury, 
and its desire to protect the government when those wrongs are the result 
of policy decisions, no matter how misbegotten or negligent-297 In addi-
tion, as in Dalehite, the Court found it "unnecessary-and indeed impos-
sible-to define with precision every contour of the discretionary 
function exception. "298 
Although the Court was unwilling, and seemingly unable, to define 
the parameters of government activity that is discretionary, it did lay out 
two factors to guide lower courts. First, "it is the nature of the conduct, 
rather than the status of the actor, that governs whether the discretion-
ary function exception applies in a given case."299 Thus, the exception 
protects all government employees, whatever their rank or job, if their 
acts are of "the nature and quality that Congress intended to shield from 
tort liability."300 According to the Court, determining whether an em-
ployee's acts are the kind to trigger the exception should be the basis of a 
court's inquiry. 301 Unfortunately, the Court provided little guidance in 
how to get beyond the semantics to answer that question. Second, at a 
minimum, the exception immunizes the "discretionary acts of the gov-
ernment acting in its role as a regulator of the conduct of private individ-
uals."302 As the Court asserted, 
293. /d. at 814 (quoting United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 163 (1993)). 
294. /d. at 810 (emphasis supplied in Varig) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 2245, 77th Cong., 
2d Sess. I, 8 (1942)). 
295. !d. at 814. 
296. /d. at 811-12. 
297. !d. at 808. 
298. !d. at 813. 
299. /d. 
300. !d. 
301. !d. 
302. /d. 
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Decisions as to the manner of enforcing regulations directly af-
fect the feasibility and practicality of the government's regula-
tory program; such decisions require the agency to establish 
priorities for the accomplishment of its policy objectives by bal-
ancing the objectives sought to be obtained against such practi-
cal considerations as staffing and funding. . . . Judicial 
intervention in such decisionmaking through private tort suits 
would require the courts to "second-guess" the political, social, 
and economic judgments of an agency exercising its regulatory 
function. It was precisely this sort of judicial intervention in 
policy making that the discretionary function exception was 
designed to prevent. 303 
Thus, in Varig, the FAA's determination of how to supervise the safety 
procedures of airplane manufacturers was the exercise of discretionary 
authority of the "most basic kind," and was thus protected by govern-
mental immunity.304 
E. Berkovitz and the Restriction of Dalehite 
Following Varig, the scope of the discretionary function exception 
was unclear. Some courts adopted a narrow reading of the exception, 
reasoning that all decisions made by government employees involve some 
element of discretion, and that a broad interpretation would virtually 
swallow the waiver of immunity-a result Congress could not have in-
tended. 305 Other courts adopted a broad reading of the exception on the 
theory that waivers of immunity are strictly construed in favor of the 
sovereign and that exceptions to such waivers should accordingly receive 
a generous construction. 306 
303. ld. at 819-20. 
304. Jd. at 820. 
305. See, e.g., Alabama Elec. Coop. v. United States, 769 F.2d 1523, 1530-31 (lith Cir. 
1985) (rejecting a broad application of the exception and holding that the discretion-
ary function exception does not per se insulate the government from liability for 
negligent design of a flood control project). 
Alabama Electric is, however, something of an anomaly among post-Varig 
cases. See Aslakson v. United States, 790 F.2d 688, 693 (8th Cir. 1986) ("Where the 
challenged governmental activity involves safety considerations under an estab-
lished policy rather than the balancing of competing public policy considerations, 
the rationale for the exception falls away and the United States will be held respon-
sible for the negligence of its employees."); see also Fishback & Killefer, Discretion-
ary Function, supra note 285, at 319-21 (criticizing Alabama Electric approach as 
based on an "incorrect" underlying premise that scientific or technical decisions do 
not implicate policy concerns and noting that the case is "almost certainly inconsis-
tent with the thrust of other post-Varig cases"). 
306. See, e.g., General Pub. Utils. Corp. v. United States, 745 F.2d 239, 248 (3d Cir. 
1984) (holding that negligent design claim involving the Three Mile Island nuclear 
power facility was barred by the discretionary function exception), cert. denied, 469 
U.S. 1228 (1985); George v. United States, 703 F.2d 90, 92 (4th Cir. 1983) (barring 
plaintiffs' claims that the government's failure to prohibit use of fuel system, made 
of two different metals, in aircraft resulted in system rusting and causing crash). See 
generally Comment, The Discretionary Function Exception and Mandatory Regula-
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In analyzing the discretionary function exception, some courts con-
sidered a number of factors, including the existence of objective stan-
dards against which to judge the conduct, 307 the extent to which the 
conduct involves public policy considerations, 308 the extent to which a 
waiver of liability would affect government programming, and the extent 
to which such a waiver would involve courts in political, economic, and 
social decisions. 309 The weight given these factors was determined on a 
case-by-case basis and many of the decisions appeared outcome oriented. 
Recently, the Supreme Court went a long way toward clarifying the 
scope of the discretionary function exception in Berkovitz v. United 
States. 310 Berkovitz involved allegations that the Bureau of Biologics of 
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) wrongfully released to the 
public a contaminated polio vaccine lot, and that the National Institute 
of Health's Division of Biologic Standards (DBS) acted wrongfully in 
licensing the manufacturer of the vaccine. These acts of negligence alleg-
edly resulted in a three-month-old infant contracting a severe case of po-
lio that left the child almost completely paralyzed and unable to breathe 
without a respirator. 311 
In Berkovitz, the Court began its inquiry into the applicability of the 
discretionary function exception by examining the nature of the conduct 
at issue, not the status of the actor. 312 Thus, the actor's membership in 
the executive branch of government, for example, had no bearing on the 
existence of the exception. The Court then created a two-part analysis to 
determine whether a government employee's conduct is discretionary. 
First, a court must consider whether the conduct 'at issue involves a mat-
ter of judgment or choice. If there is no choice involved-if a federal 
statute, regulation or policy specifically prescribes a course of action 
which the employee failed to follow-the discretionary function excep-
tion will not apply and the analysis ends.313 If the challenged conduct 
involves some element of choice, then the court passes to the second part 
of the analysis and determines whether the choice or judgment represents 
a decision based on considerations of public policy. 314 If so, the govern-
ment is immune from suit; if not, there will be no bar to government 
liability. "In sum, the discretionary function exception insulates the gov-
tions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1300, 1320-23 (1987); Fishback & Killefer, Discretionary 
Function, supra note 285, at 298-300, 303-21. 
307. See Driscoll v. United States, 525 F.2d 136, 138 (9th Cir. 1975) (citing Jaffe, Suits 
Against Governments and Officers: Damage Actions, 77 HARV. L. REV. 209, 219 
(1963)). 
308. /d. 
309. Id. 
310. 486 u.s. 531 ( 1988). 
311. /d. at 583. 
312. /d. at 536 (citing United States v. S.A. Empresa De Viaca Aerea Rio Grandense 
(Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 808 (1984)). 
313. /d. 
314. Id. at 537 (quoting Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 36 (1953)) ("Where there 
is room for policy judgment and decision there is discretion."). 
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ernment from liability if the action challenged in the case involves the 
permissible exercise of policy judgment."315 
The foregoing analysis resulted in a unanimous decision in favor of 
the plaintiffs in Berkovitz, and thus in a conclusion that the discretionary 
function exception did not apply.316 FDA regulations empowered, but 
did not require, the FDA to examine and prevent the distribution of non-
complying lots of the vaccine. Plaintiffs alleged that under the authority 
of these regulations, the FDA adopted a policy of testing all lots for com-
pliance with safety standards, and that notwithstanding this policy, the 
FDA failed to test the lot in question and released it for public consump-
tion. The Court held that the discretionary function exception did not 
bar a claim based upon the failure of FDA officials to test the lot in 
question, since FDA policy required the testing and left officials with no 
matter of choice or judgment.3I7 
Similarly, the Court held that the discretionary function exception 
did not bar that portion of the claim based upon the decision to license 
the manufacturer. The plaintiffs alleged that DBS issued the license 
without receiving test data required by statutes and regulations as a pre-
condition to licensure. Under these circumstances, the statutory frame-
work provided no room for choice or judgment and the discretionary 
function exception did not apply.318 
Berkovitz restricted the Varig expansion of the discretionary func-
tion exception. In "restating and clarifying" the exception's scope, the 
Court "specifically ... reject[ed] the government's argument that the 
exception precludes liability for any and all acts arising out of the regula-
tory programs of federal agencies."319 In quashing the government's at-
tempt to further expand the exception to immunize all governmental 
regulatory activity per se, the Court narrowed its previous interpretation 
of the language and legislative history of the exception. 320 The Court 
also relied on its prior decisions in Indian Towing and Rayonier in re-
jecting immunity for "core" or "uniquely governmental functions."321 
F. Post-Berkovitz· Toward a Narrower Reading of "Discretionary 
Function" 
The Berkovitz narrowing of the discretionary function exception and 
the resurrection of Indian Towing suggest a limitation of Varig princi-
315. /d. 
316. /d. at 544-45. 
317. /d. at 544 ("When a suit charges an agency with failing to act in accord with a 
specific mandatory directive, the discretionary function exception does not apply."). 
318. ld. at 542-44. 
319. ld. at 538 ("To the extent we have not already put the Government's argument to 
rest, we do so now. The discretionary function exception applies only to conduct 
that involves the permissible exercise of policy judgment."). ld. at 539. 
320. Id. at 538-39. 
321. /d. at 539 n.5. 
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pies, as illustrated by post-Berkovitz cases.322 In McMichael v. United 
States, 323 for example, claims were filed against the United States under 
the FfCA seeking damages for injuries and deaths resulting from a 
munitions plant explosion which occurred during an electrical storm. 
The plant's safety regulations required that the plant be evacuated during 
electrical storms. 324 The district court found that the government was 
negligent in failing to enforce the safety standards of the plant, and held 
that the discretionary function exception did not bar the plaintiff's 
claim. 325 Applying Berkovitz, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower 
court's decision, holding that the government inspectors did not exercise 
discretion since evacuating the plant was mandated by safety 
regulations. 326 
The Tenth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Ayala v. Joy Man-
ufacturing Company. 327 In Ayala, plaintiffs brought wrongful death suits 
against the government for negligent inspection of a continuous coal 
mining machine which caused a methane and coal dust explosion in a 
Colorado coal mine. The district court, relying on Varig, held that the 
regulatory inspection came under the discretionary function exception 
and dismissed the action. 328 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit, citing 
Berkovitz and McMichael, reversed the district court's decision, and held 
that the conduct of the government mining inspector "involved no dis-
cretion or policy making choices."329 
G. Conclusion 
The holdings in Berkovitz, McMichael and Ayala suggest a move 
away from Varig's unwarranted expansion of the discretionary function 
exception and clearly provide a better framework for analysis of this ex-
ception in the future. 330 While there remains some confusion over the 
scope of the discretionary function exception, 331 the Supreme Court ap-
322. See, e.g., Ayala v. Joy Mfg. Co., 877 F.2d 846 (lOth Cir. 1989); McMichael v. 
United States, 856 F.2d 1026 (8th Cir. 1988). Cf Patterson v. United States, 856 
F.2d 670 (1988) (holding that an alleged negligent inspection of a fire site by officials 
from the Office of Surface Mining was not within the discretionary function excep-
tion), vacated, 881 F.2d 127 (4th Cir. 1989) (en bane) (reinstating the district court's 
decision to dismiss the FfCA claim). 
323. 856 F.2d 1026 (8th Cir. 1988). 
324. /d. at 1030. 
325. /d. at 1030-31. 
326. /d. at 1033. "(T]he particular violation at issue here did not involve the weighing of 
any facts or policies and was therefore not discretionary." /d. at 1033-34 n.8 (citing 
Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531 (1988)). 
327. 877 F.2d 846 (lOth Cir. 1989). 
328. /d. at 848. 
329. /d. at 848-49. 
330. See supra notes 305-329 and accompanying text. 
331. For example, see Patterson v. United States, 856 F.2d 670 (1988), vacated, 881 F.2d 
127 (4th Cir. 1989) (en bane). In Patterson, residents of a house built on a subterra-
nean coal refuse pile were injured or killed after inhaling smoke and noxious gases 
when an above-ground fire ignited the refuse pile below. One year before their inju-
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pears to be trimming back its previous expansion of the exception in ac-
cord with Congress' purpose in enacting both the FTCA and its 
exceptions. Other courts should follow the Court's analysis and bar only 
those claims where the negligent governmental acts involve actual public 
policy considerations. 
VI. SUMMARY 
Although the FTCA undoubtedly provided and continues to pro-
vide much needed relief to countless individuals, numerous claims still go 
without adequate remedy because the FTCA immunity waiver is only 
partial. Judicial expansion of explicit exceptions, and the judicial crea-
ries, the plaintiffs had complained of the problem to the Federal Office of Surface 
Mining (OSM). An OSM inspector had visited the site but no action was taken. 
The plaintiffs alleged that their injuries were caused by the negligent OSM inspec-
tions. Patterson, 856 F.2d at 671. The government responded that the acts of the 
OSM field investigator were "discretionary" and thus protected by section 2680(a). 
A three-member panel of the Fourth Circuit disagreed. While acknowledging 
that the inspector's investigation "inevitably require[s] some decision-making," the 
court concluded that the type of discretion is not of the nature and quality to trigger 
the exception. Id. at 674. Specifically, the court found that field investigators do 
not have the authority to make policy decisions or even recommendations as to final 
disposition of the complaint. Thus, because the inspector's acts were not discretion-
ary, the exception did not apply. /d. This was true even though the plaintiffs did 
not allege that the inspector had disregarded specific and mandatory inspection 
guidelines, as in Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531 (1988), or that OSM acted 
negligently in finding that no emergency situation warranting the expenditure of 
funds existed. Patterson, 856 F.2d at 671, 674. The court, relying on the Supreme 
Court's recent narrowing of the discretionary function in Berkovitz, specifically re-
jected the Dalehite operation/planning distinction as "either too simplistic or too 
complicated and specious." /d. at 673. The court seemed comfortable waiving im-
munity for low-level negligence, but hesitant to waive immunity for "high-altitude" 
decisions. 
On rehearing, however, after considering the evidence presented on re-exami-
nation, the Fourth Circuit, en bane, found that the OSM's final decision that no 
emergency existed which warranted the expenditure of emergency funds was a dis-
cretionary one. Patterson, 881 F.2d at 128. In vacating the panel opinion, the court 
did not address the issues raised by Berkovitz. The court's reasoning, while difficult 
to determine, appears to be based on a factual finding from the record, and should 
not be construed as a retreat from Berkovitz principles. See also Piechowicz v. 
United States, 885 F.2d 1207 (4th Cir. 1989). 
In Piechowicz, two would-be witnesses in a criminal trial were murdered after 
receiving threats not to testify. The witnesses had reported the threats to the Assis-
tant U.S. Attorney and the DEA agent in charge of the case, but neither official had 
offered the witnesses protection. The plaintiffs sued the government and the two 
officials for failing to place the witnesses in the Witness Security Program. /d. at 
1210. 
The Fourth Circuit held that federal witness protection statutes and regulations 
grant agents in charge of a case "considerable latitude to decide whether and how to 
protect witnesses." /d. at 1212. The decision whether to offer witnesses federal 
protection was a matter of choice and discretion "involving the permissible exer-
cise" of public policy considerations. Id. at 1211 (quoting Berkovitz v. United 
States, 486 U.S. 531, 539 (1988)). Therefore, the officials' failure to provide protec-
tion passed both parts of the Berkovitz test, and triggered application of the discre-
tionary function exception. See supra notes 310-315 and accompanying text. 
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tion of others, have led to a reservation of immunity far beyond that 
originally intended by Congress. In some situations, courts have en-
larged exceptions to the point where the rule has been swallowed and the 
waiver of immunity rendered meaningless. Judicial restraint in interpret-
ing the exceptions should be encouraged and Congress should recognize 
and remedy overbroad judicial construction by amendment and clearer 
statutory definitions. 
Thoughtful counsel must remain aware of the government's re-
served immunity and should attempt to couch claims in language falling 
within the waiver of immunity, rather than within a reservation. For 
example, claims for injuries sustained in an assault or battery at the 
hands of a government employee should be framed in terms of his superi-
ors' negligence in hiring, supervising and training him, and where the 
government has a duty to control the wrongdoer's conduct independent 
of the employment relationship, this should be stated. Similarly, cases 
impacted by the foreign country exception should focus on those negli-
gent acts or omissions which occurred in the United States and be framed 
as "headquarters claims." Fe res claims should be pleaded so as to make 
clear that no challenge to military discipline is intended. And all claims, 
where possible, should avoid challenge to governmental policy decisions 
and should instead focus on actions or failures to act that are violative of 
established policies and procedures. 
Counsel also must be aware of the varied treatment accorded the 
reservations of immunity by the various circuits and should make every 
effort to present claims in the most favorable forum. For example, the 
Fourth Circuit has proved unreceptive to narrow constructions of the 
Feres doctrine and the intentional tort and discretionary function excep-
tions, while the Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits have taken the oppo-
site tact. Finally, counsel must be aware that administrative remedies 
may be available for meritorious claims, even where suit is barred by the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity. Benefits available under the Veterans' 
Benefits Act, the Military Claims Act, the Foreign Claims Act, and simi-
lar statutes sometimes provide meaningful administrative remedies where 
none exist at law. 
